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[1] 
A New Look at Criminal Liability 
for Selling Dangerous Vehicles: 
Lessons from General Motors 
and Toyota 
STEVEN B. DOW AND NAN S. ELLIS 
Automobile safety is one of the most serious public health issues facing our 
country.  In addition to the costs in terms of personal injury and death, 
automobile accidents cost society billions of dollars in lost productivity and 
medical costs.1  In 1966, there were over 50,000 deaths from automobile 
accidents.  By 2015, this number had fallen to approximately 35,000 deaths 
and 2.4 million injuries resulting from automobile accidents.2  By some 
measures, this is a remarkable reduction that might lead us to conclude that 
automobile safety is no longer an important public policy concern.  The 
reduction in automobile deaths has been due to several factors, including 
increased focus on drunk driving, the use of seat belts and the lowering of 
speed limits.3  The reduction does not necessarily mean that cars 
themselves are safer.  In fact, in 2014, over sixty-four million vehicles were 
recalled because of safety concerns.4  This number represents a staggering 
 
 Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University 
 Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Loyola University Maryland 
 1. U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2020 
Report, (1997), http://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/whatis/planning/2020Report/2020report.html [https:// 
perma.cc/9YQ3-CYTL].  In 1966, the National Academy of Sciences published a white paper entitled 
“Accidental Death and Disability – The Neglected Disease of Modern Society.”  The report likened 
automobile safety issues to an epidemic and argued that this “neglected epidemic of modern society 
[was] the nation’s most important environmental health problem.”  National Academy of Sciences, 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISABILITY – THE NEGLECTED DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY, 5 (1966) 
(cited in Aaron Ezroj, Product Liability After Unintended Acceleration: How Automotive Litigation Has 
Evolved, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 470, 473 (2014)). 
 2. NHTSA Stats, May 2017, https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812348.  
In 1996, there were over 6.8 million crashes resulting in over 41,000 deaths and 3.5 million injuries.  
NHTSA Report, supra note 1. 
 3. These three factors are cited by the CDC as actions that can be taken to further reduce 
accidents and deaths. Center for Disease Control Motor Vehicle Crash Deaths, July 18, 2016, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/motor-vehicle-safety/index.html. 
 4. Rena Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”: Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?, 9 HARV. L. 
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forty-five percent of all passenger cars registered in 2012!5  A number of 
high-profile cases have drawn attention to the problem and serve as 
examples for the issue to be discussed in this article. 
On September 18, 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced 
that it had entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with 
General Motors (GM) stemming from an ignition-switch defect which 
allegedly killed at least 169 people.6  In this agreement, GM promised to 
pay a $900-million fine and accepted independent monitoring.7  This 
followed Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota) entering into a DPA with the 
DOJ in which it agreed to pay $1.2 billion for wire fraud for failure to 
disclose safety issues related to unintended acceleration in a number of its 
models.8 
The announcement of the DPA with GM was met with severe 
criticism.9  Critics noted that the $900-million fine was insignificant when 
compared to the $156 billion GM reported in revenue.10  Moreover, critics 
called for individual and corporate criminal responsibility.  Clarence 
Ditlow of the Center for Auto Safety said, “Yet no one from GM went to 
jail or was even charged with criminal homicide.  This shows a weakness 
in the law not a weakness in the facts.  GM killed innocent consumers.  GM 
has paid millions of dollars to its lobbyists to keep criminal penalties out of 
the Vehicle Safety Act since 1966.  Today thanks to its lobbyists, GM 
officials walk off scot free while its customers are six feet under.”11  Public 
 
& POL’Y REV. 443 (2015). 
 5. Id. 




 7. This followed an agreement reached with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) on May 16, 2014, in which it agreed to pay a $35 million civil penalty and to be subjected to 
NHTSA oversight. U.S. Department of Transportation Announces Record Fines, Unprecedented 
Oversight Requirements in GM Investigation, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PRESS RELEASE, 
May 16, 2014, http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2014/DOT-Announces-Record-
Fines,-Unprecedented-Oversight-Requirements-in-GM-Investigation  [hereinafter DOT Press Release]. 
 8. Justice Department Announces Criminal Charge Against Toyota Motor Corporation and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $1.2 Billion Financial Penalty, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRESS 
RELEASE, (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-criminal-
charge-against-toyota-motor-corporation-and-deferred [hereinafter DOJ Press Release]. 
 9. David Ingram, Corporate “Siloing” an Obstacle to Charging GM Employees – Prosecutor, 
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/17/gm-settlement-individuals-idUS 
L1N11N17E20150917. 
 10. Harwell, supra note 6. 
 11. Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, CORPORATE CRIME 
REPORTER (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/critics-rip-gm-deferred-
prosecution-in-switch-case/ [https://perma.cc/49CU-83DQ].  Professor Brandon Garrett has been 
quoted as saying, “It is deeply disturbing if GM settles this case in a deferred prosecution, out of court, 
with no individuals charged . . . .  A case this serious should result in a criminal conviction for the 
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Citizen’s Rob Weissman noted that “This deal will not deter future 
corporate wrongdoers, it will not hold GM accountable and it sets back the 
demand for justice by the family members of the victims of GM’s horrible 
actions.”12  In defending the DPA, Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York at the time, said that “the law doesn’t 
always let us do what we wish we could.”13  Acknowledging the difficulty 
in getting a criminal conviction, Bharara admitted that it is not unlawful for 
an automobile manufacturer to put potentially deadly cars on the market.14  
Ditlow asserted “the law is just inadequate to the crime.”15  A limited 
number of scholars have also voiced criticism calling for criminal liability 
for top GM executives.16 
If the issue of automobile safety is perceived as one of high priority, 
why are the laws inadequate to address it?  The traditional approach to 
products liability, including liability stemming from defective automobiles, 
has been one of civil tort liability.  Injured consumers of defective products 
can sue manufacturers and sellers of those products for negligence.  When 
cars became prevalent and the resulting injuries from automobile accidents 
became common, the law responded.  By eliminating the privity 
requirement and making it easier for injured consumers and bystanders to 
sue sellers and manufacturers of defective products, civil liability remained 
the primary regulatory mechanism.  Punitive damages could be imposed to 
punish egregious wrongdoing; compensatory damages were awarded to 
make injured consumers whole.  In this way, plaintiffs were compensated, 
defendants were supposedly deterred from selling dangerous products and 
those whose behavior was particularly egregious were punished with 
punitive damages. 
In 1966, this scheme of private tort liability was supplemented by 
creation of the NHTSA.17  The NHTSA was created to address a perceived 
public health concern—the number of highway injuries and deaths.  Under 
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (“Vehicle 
 
company, and many criminal convictions for the individuals involved.”  Id. 
 12. Id.  Professor Garrett continued, “It is unconscionable that a giant corporation can conceal 
information about deadly safety defects for a decade, be responsible for the deaths of more than 100 
people as a result and escape any criminal liability based only a corporate fine and a promise not to do 
wrong again in the future.  It is equally unconscionable that none of the executives inside General 
Motors responsible are going to be held criminally accountable …” 
 13. Why the law doesn’t actually cover GM’s deadly defects, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 17, 2015), 
accessed at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-doesnt-actually-cover-gms-deadly-defects [https:// 
perma.cc/YV4T-CNK7]. 
 14. Ingram, supra note 9. 
 15. Harwell, supra note 6. 
 16. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 446 (“[I]ndividual executives with the power to establish early 
warning systems and repair defects quickly must perceive a personal threat if they do not act”). 
 17. NHTSA 2020 Report, supra note 1. 
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Safety Act”) and the Highway Safety Act of 1966, the NHTSA was 
charged with “reducing deaths, injuries and economic losses resulting from 
motor vehicle crashes.  This was accomplished by setting and enforcing 
safety performance standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle 
equipment, and through grants to state and local governments to enable 
them to conduct effective local highway safety programs.”18  The primary 
way in which the NHTSA assures automobile safety is through product 
recalls. 
In this article, we will argue that automobile safety is still a major 
public health concern in light of the large number of recalls and the high-
profile cases of the last few years.  We will further argue and that the 
current approach (of civil liability supplemented by the NHSTA) is 
inadequate to deter automobile manufacturers from designing and selling 
dangerous cars.  We will consider possible public policy approaches to 
better protect consumers. 
To accomplish this objective, we will, in Part I, outline the two cases 
used as examples: GM and Toyota.  In Part II, we will outline the existing 
regulatory scheme starting with the traditional approach of civil liability 
and the regulatory scheme adopted by the Vehicle Safety Act implemented 
by the NHSTA.  We will then discuss the alternative of imposing criminal 
liability for what has traditionally been civil tort liability in Part II.  In this 
section, we will consider the practical limitations in imposing criminal 
liability upon corporations: the size of the fines and the use of DPAs.19  
Moreover, in this part, we will consider the inadequacy of laws at both the 
federal and state levels criminalizing the design and sale of dangerous 
products.  We will note that despite the widespread belief to the contrary, 
prosecution of white-collar criminals is actually quite common but said 
prosecution is more prevalent for certain types of crimes and almost 
entirely prosecuted in federal court.  Therefore, we will argue that there is a 
need to add new criminal statutes that federal prosecutors can use in cases 
like GM and Toyota.  In Part III, we will offer a two-pronged approach.  
The first prong is a statutory approach.  We propose enactment of a new 
federal statute.  This statute would, first, impose criminal liability on 
 
 18. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Website, Who we are and what we do,  
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Who+We+Are+and+What+We+Do. 
 19. We will largely ignore the larger more philosophical question of whether criminal liability can 
and should be imposed on the corporate form.  See generally, see e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 687, 692 (1997) ( arguing that civil liability should be imposed on the corporate entity with 
criminal liability imposed on the individual corporate wrongdoers); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); John Hasnas, Where is Felix 
Cohen when we Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporations, 
19 J.L. & POL’Y 55, 76 (2010) (arguing that “it is impossible to punish a corporation”). 
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individual corporate executives.  This approach is not novel.  Others have 
advocated for this and we do not argue with this as a partial solution.20  It 
is, however, insufficient.  This approach ignores the difficulty in finding 
identifiable wrongdoers in the corporate environment.  Moreover, and more 
importantly, it ignores the culpability of the corporate entity and the effect 
of corporate culture on the individual decision-maker.21  In our proposed 
statute we also argue for corporate criminal liability.  Several federal 
statutes were proposed in the aftermath of the GM/Toyota cases, but these 
statutes basically required early warning and increased the penalties for 
failure to warn.  We see these statutes as a laudable first step but 
insufficient.  Because the size of the fines, while appearing to be large, are 
typically seen as a cost of doing business by corporate criminal defendants, 
we call for a more severe sanction.  If a corporation has been found guilty 
of manufacturing and marketing an automobile that it knows is defective 
and the defect causes death or serious injury, we believe that company 
should lose its license to do business for a specified period and should 
suffer debarment for a specified period.22  This is a type of corporate 
incapacitation. 
In a case involving a corporation that knowingly sells a product that 
causes a substantial number of deaths and injuries, we advocate a more 
severe level of corporate incapacitation: permanent loss of a business 
license or permanent revocation of the corporate charter.  The latter step 
would effectively be a corporate death penalty.  Moreover, because most 
white-collar criminals are prosecuted in federal court rather than state 
court, we propose a federal law that would impose both individual and 
criminal liability and would specify the punishments we advocate.  The 
 
 20. Others have argued for prosecution under existing state laws (e.g., negligent homicide).  As we 
will discuss infra, however, prosecution in state courts is unusual for a variety of reasons including 
doing so would take enormous resources and there are political reasons at the local level to ignore these 
cases.  See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
 21. For example, Toyota’s culture in the time leading up to the sudden acceleration cases has been 
described as a “corporate culture of secrecy.”  See Joel Finch, Toyota Sudden Acceleration: A Case 
Study of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Recalls for Change, 22 LOY. CONS. L. 
REV. 472, 474 (2010). 
 22. It is already illegal for an automobile manufacturer to sell cars that are not compliant with 
current federal safety standards. 49 C.F.R. § 573.11 (2010); 49 U.S.C. § 30112 (2010).  We are 
proposing extending this prohibition to all vehicles manufactured by manufacturers who sell vehicles 
that they know are defective and likely to cause death or personal injury.  At least one other scholar has 
proposed something similar.  Finch advocated for what the termed a “tiered probationary system.”  See 
Finch, supra note 21, at 494 (“Congress should work with the NHSTA to develop a probationary 
system for automobile manufacturers.  Such a system would rate each automaker’s track record with 
safety standards compliance and defects.  A tiered system would serve as a reward to companies who 
comply in good faith and a deterrent for those who fail to meet safety standards and take appropriate 
precautionary measures for defects”).  Moreover, Finch advocated for the probationary period to be 
assessed by the NHSTA.  By contrast, we are proposing that the period be imposed as a sanction against 
manufacturers who have been found criminally liable. 
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second prong of our approach involves implementation.  Because there is 
reason to believe that even with additional statutory tools federal 
prosecutors may not vigorously pursue criminal cases against corporate 
defendants, we will urge policy changes in the DOJ regarding such cases.23 
I.  FAILURE OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM: TWO CASE STUDIES 
A.  TOYOTA AND SUDDEN ACCELERATION 
As early as 2000, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA)  began receiving complaints of sudden acceleration in certain 
Toyota models.24  Toyota first blamed their customers, arguing that 
confused drivers had inadvertently stepped on the accelerator  rather than 
the brake pedals.  In August 2009, a famous 911 call alerted the public to a 
problem with Toyota vehicles.25  Toyota then blamed the problem on 
improperly installed floor mats.26  In late 2009, Toyota finally 
acknowledged that the problem was larger than defectively installed floor 
mats.  Later that year, the company recalled eight of its U.S. models for 
“floor mat entrapment susceptibility” and assured the public that the “root 
cause” of the unintended acceleration problem had been addressed.27  
Unfortunately, this was not true.  Toyota had conducted internal tests that 
revealed that not all affected cars had been recalled and that there was a 
second cause of unintended acceleration—the sticky accelerator pedal 
problem.28  By 2007, Toyota had received a series of reports alleging 
unintended acceleration and opened an internal defect investigation.  
Throughout 2007, Toyota denied the need for a recall even though their 
internal testing revealed that some of their models had design features that 
 
 23. This refers to the reluctance of federal prosecutors to go after white-collar and corporate 
defendants because of their fear that it may hurt their win-loss record, etc. and the need for a policy 
change regarding annual review for raises and promotion.  See e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKEN SHIT 
CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017). 
 24. Suzanne M. Kirchhoff & David Randall Peterman, Cong. Research Serv., RLR41205, 
UNINTENDED ACCELERATION IN PASSENGER VEHICLES 1 (2010).  In that same year, Toyota issued a 
limited recall of 10,000 Lexus models sold in England.  Finch, supra note 21, at 475. 
 25. Statement of Facts (2014).  Deferred Prosecution Agreement, accessed at http://www.jus 
tice.gov/opa/documents/toyota-stmt-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7JH-MMXA] [hereinafter Statement 
of Facts Toyota], at ¶ 9. 
 26. Finch, supra note 21, at 476-77.  Toyota insisted that there was “no evidence to support any 
other conclusion.”  Finch, id. (citing Bill Vlassic et al., Toyota’s Slow Awakening to a Deadly Problem, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009).  Toyota went so far as to issue a press release claiming that the NHTSA had 
determined “that a defect exists in vehicles in which the driver’s floor mat is compatible with the 
vehicle and properly secured.”  Finch, id., at 477. 
 27. In 2009, Toyota argued that the problem with the acceleration pedal, not the floor mat.  Finch, 
supra note 21, at 477. 
 28. Statement of Facts Toyota, supra note 25, at ¶ 10. 
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made floor mat entrapment likely.29  In September 2007, Toyota negotiated 
a limited recall and touted this as a major victory via internal emails: “had 
the agency. . . pushed for recall of the throttle pedal assembly (for 
instance), we would be looking at upwards of $100 million+ in unnecessary 
costs.”30  Shortly after the limited recall, Toyota engineers revised Toyota’s 
internal guidelines in a manner that would make floor mat entrapment less 
likely.  It was decided, however, to only apply the new guidelines when the 
model received a full model redesign which occurred every three to five 
years.  It was not  until 2010 that Toyota acknowledged the full extent of 
the problem.  On January 21, 2010, Toyota issued another recall asserting 
that the sudden acceleration problem was caused by “abnormal friction” in 
defective accelerator pedals (“sticky pedals”).31 
Sudden acceleration resulted in at least eighty-nine deaths since the 
2002 model year32 (more than all other manufacturers combined)33 and 
Toyota faced over 400 wrongful death and injury lawsuits.  In addition to 
the $1.2 billion the firm agreed to pay as part of the DPA, Toyota also 
faced civil penalties of more than $66 million.34 
B. GENERAL MOTORS AND THE IGNITION SWITCH 
GM began developing a new ignition switch in the late 1990s.35  GM 
provided specifications to its supplier with respect to the torque needed to 
turn the key in the ignition.36  The switch “failed miserably” in early testing 
and was redesigned.37  Although the new switch failed to meet GM’s 
specifications, it was approved by GM engineer Raymond DeGiorgio.38  In 
 
 29. Id. at ¶18. 
 30. Id. at ¶ 19. 
 31. Finch, supra note 21, at 478. 
 32. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 445 (citing NHTSA statistics); Finch, supra note 21. 
 33. The death toll is reported to be more than double the amount of all other manufacturers 
combined.  Finch, supra note 21, at 476. 
 34. DOJ Press Release, supra note 8. 
 35. Valukas Report 25, 34 (May 29, 2014).  Report to the Board of Directors of General Motors 
Corporation regarding ignition switch recalls, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/05/busi 
ness/06gm-report-doc.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T68D-C35N]. 
 36. If the key turned too easily, the ignition could easily be moved from the “run” to the 
“accessory” position.  This would result in the car’s power being shut off and the disablement of the 
car’s airbags.  Valukas Report, id., at 3540. 
 37. Id. at 42. 
 38. Id. at 39, 40.  DeGiorgio was given a choice by the supplier.  He could “do nothing or elect to 
change the Ignition Switch to solve the problem of low torque, which might, however, cause electrical 
problems and would cause delay in getting the Ignition Switch into production.”  Id. at 47.  He chose to 
do nothing.  Arguably, DeGiorgio is the chief villain in this story. It seems likely that he could be found 
liable as an individual.  See infra note 147 and accompanying text where the possibility of individual 
criminal liability is discussed.  This would not, however, preclude corporate criminal liability.  See infra 
notes 156-163 and accompanying text where this option is discussed. 
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2002, GM began manufacturing cars with the defective ignition switch39.  
The defect was such that drivers could inadvertently turn the ignition 
switch from the “run” to the “accessory” position.40  This resulted in 
vehicle stalls while moving, loss of vehicle power and prevented 
deployment of airbags in the event of a crash.41  This caused the driver to 
lose control of the power steering and power brakes.42  By some estimates, 
the defective ignition switch resulted in more than 100 deaths.43  The 
problems with the switch were known by the engineers at GM as early as 
2002, but nothing was done to address the problems.44  In fact, certain 
engineers knew of the problem before the affected cars went into 
production in 2002 but nevertheless approved production.45 
In 2004, GM customers began reporting problems with sudden stalls 
and engine shut-offs.  GM determined that the problem did not pose a 
safety concern and decided against any changes.46  They rejected an 
improvement to the head of the key that would have significantly reduced 
the likelihood of an unexpected shut-off at the cost of less than one dollar 
per car.47  Instead, they issued a statement acknowledging the problem but 
adding that GM did not believe that this posed a safety issue.48  In February 
2005, GM notified their dealers of the issue.  They urged dealers to notify 
their customers of the potential for a moving stall and to advise consumers 
to “remove unessential items from their key chain[s].49  At the same time, 
the Current Production Improvement Team concluded that there was “no 
 
       39.  Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 54. 
 40. Bernard W. Bell, Recalling the Lawyers: The NHTSA, GM, and the Chevrolet Cobalt, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2016). 
 41. Valukas Report, supra note 35. 
 42. Statement of Facts (2014).  Deferred Prosecution Agreement, accessed at http://www. 
justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/772301/download  [hereinafter Statement of Facts GM], at ¶ 4. 
 43. Maggie McGrath, General Motors recalls another 7 million vehicles, some dating back to 
1997. FORBES,  (June 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/06/30/general-
motorsrecalls-another-7-million-vehicles-some-dating-back-to-1997 [https://perma.cc/475R-332R].  
GM acknowledged 15 deaths as a result of the ignition switch defect.  Statement of Facts GM, supra 
note 41, at ¶ 4. 
 44. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 1. 
 45. Statement of Facts GM, supra note 41, at ¶ 5. 
 46. At that time, Current Production Improvement Team classified the problem as a Level 3 (or 
“moderate”) problem that could be addressed at the next dealership visit.  Valukas Report, supra note 
35, at 63-64.  Because the problem was defined as a “customer convenience issue” rather than a safety 
issue, cost considerations were considered when evaluating possible solutions. Valukas Report, id. at 2. 
See also id. at 54 (“Complaints of ignition shut-offs and moving stalls were classified as non-safety 
issues; that classification was not revisited even as new complaints surfaced; and resolution of the 
issues remained mired in cost and ‘business case’ justifications – factors that would have played no role 
in resolving a safety issue”). 
 47. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 67. 
 48. Statement of Facts GM, supra note 41, at ¶ 6. 
 49. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 92. 
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acceptable business case”50 for fixing the ignition switch problem.  In 2006, 
DeGiorgio approved a change to the ignition switch designed to increase 
the torque needed to turn the key.  He failed, however, to create a unique 
part number for the modified switch and did not advise others of the 
change.51 
Because of the number of complaints, in 2011, GM in-house lawyers 
met with GM engineers and asked that an investigation be undertaken by 
the GM Product Investigation unit.  The investigation was slow moving; 
the lead investigator continually disregarded reports.  By Spring 2012, 
however, it was clear to GM personnel that the ignition switch problem did 
pose a safety issue because it could prevent the airbag from deploying in 
the case of an accident.  It was not  until April 2013 that GM investigators 
discovered that the design of the ignition switch had been changed in 2006.  
Despite this knowledge,52 it was not until February 2014 that GM notified 
the NHTSA and the public of the incidents and began an initial recall of 
700,000 vehicles.53  GM admitted that the defective switch problem was 
not handled in the normal way; instead steps were taken to delay the recall 
until they could package and explain the issue.  During this time frame, 
GM assured the NHTSA that they were acting promptly and in accordance 
with their formal recall process.54  Moreover, during this time frame, GM 
touted the reliability and safety of its cars to the public.  Although it sold no 
new cars during this time frame, it sold pre-owned cars accompanied by 
certificates assuring customers that all components met safety standards.  In 
total, GM recalled 40 million cars,55 set up a compensation fund promising 
more than $1 million per victim and  set aside $2.5 billion for this fund. 
The Toyota and GM cases offer two examples of automobile safety 
failures.  We have a regulatory system that is designed to protect the public 
from such failures and to assure automobile safety.  In Part II, we will 
outline the basic provisions of this regulatory scheme. 
 
 50. To present an acceptable business case, a solution had to solve the issue, meet the cost 
considerations and have sufficient lead time to implement.  Id. at 69. 
 51. Id. at 98, 100-102.  This is a highly unusual practice.  It made it difficult for investigators, 
including GM engineers and plaintiff lawyers, to identify the cause of the problem. 
 52. Valukas refers to this as a “bombshell.”  Id. at 11. 
 53. Statement of Facts GM, supra note 41, at ¶ 8. 
 54. Id., at ¶ 9. 
 55. AP (2014).  New recalls and questions about auto parts safety, accessed at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/business/new-recalls-and-questions-about-auto-parts-safety/2014/07/01/117 
deb24-00ee-11e4-b203-f4b4c664cccf_story.htm. 
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II.  THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME 
A.  CIVIL LIABILITY 
Consumers rely on car manufacturers to design, market and sell safe 
cars.  There are sound public policy reasons why we expect manufacturers 
to ensure that the products they sell are reasonably safe.  It is necessary to a 
smooth functioning of the economy and necessary to protect consumers.  
To accomplish these goals, products liability law is typically designed to 
serve the goals of compensation, deterrence and in some cases retribution.  
When manufacturers instead offer for sale defective products, the law 
typically responds by allowing the injured consumer recourse—he/she can 
sue the company for civil liability and recover damages for his/her injury.56 
As early as the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company57 
courts recognized a duty on the part of manufacturers of products to protect 
the users of such products from injury. In the now famous language, Judge 
Cardozo held: 
We hold, then, that the principle of [inherent danger] is not 
limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things 
which in their normal operation are implements of destruction.  If 
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place 
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of 
danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be 
expected.  If to the element of danger there is added knowledge 
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, 
and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the 
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it 
carefully.58 
In so holding, the court made clear that negligent manufacturers were 
liable to people who are affected by their product without the defense of 
privity.  In the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,59 the 
court made clear that lack of privity was no longer a defense.  In 1963, in 
the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,60 the California Supreme 
Court first articulated the theory of strict liability, imposing liability on a 
manufacturer of a defective product without a showing of negligence.  
Judge Traynor held that: 
 
 56. See, e.g., Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Kevin F. Calcagnie, A Catalyst for Safety:  Americans Can 
Thank Products Liability Litigation for Helping to Make Their Cars, Drugs, and Other Products Safer 
than Ever.  But there is still work to be done., 45-NOV. TRIAL 32 (2009). 
 57. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). 
 58. Id. at 389. 
 59. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (N.Y. 1960). 
 60. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
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To establish the manufacture’s liability, it was sufficient that 
the plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the [product] 
in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in the 
design and manufacture of which the plaintiff was not aware that 
made the [product] unsafe for its intended use.61 
Thus, civil liability emerged as the traditional method of assuring 
automobile safety and of compensating plaintiffs when they are injured by 
unsafe vehicles. 
Civil liability, however, is inadequate for several reasons.  First, it 
should be noted that the evolution of products liability law from 
Winterbottom v. Wright,62 where the court upheld a strict privity standard, 
to the Greenman case discussed above, was one of expanding options for 
plaintiffs.  In other words, the law was making it easier for plaintiffs to sue 
manufacturers of defective products.  The result was that the number of 
product liability lawsuits increased significantly especially during the 
1960s and 1970s.63  To some extent, this changed in the 1980s.  During this 
period, the success rate of such lawsuits decreased.64  In response to cries 
for tort reform, states imposed caps on pain and suffering, limited punitive 
damages and the federal Class Action Fairness Act made it more difficult 
for plaintiffs to bring class actions.65 
Second, to some extent criminal and civil liabilities serve different 
public policy goals.  Both criminal law and civil law aim “to shape 
people’s conduct along lines that are beneficial to society.”66  They do this, 
however, in different ways.  Civil liability is largely compensatory.  Civil 
damages are awarded to, as much as possible, put the injured plaintiff back 
in the position he/she was in prior to the injury.  Civil damages also serve a 
deterrent function.  It is believed that people will act carefully to avoid 
paying civil damages.67  By contrast, criminal law acts as a vehicle to 
 
 61. 59 Cal. 2d, at 64. 
 62. Winterbottom v. Wright, 20 Meeson & Welsby 109 (Exchequer of Pleas [England] 1842). 
 63. Ezroj, supra note 1. 
 64. Ezroj, supra note 1, at 470. 
 65. See e.g., Conor Dwyer Reynolds, The Role of Private Litigation in the Automobile Recall 
Process, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 158160 (2016) (describing the effect that caps on 
noneconomic damages have on the likelihood of a products liability filing). 
 66. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2003).  See also R. A. Nagareda, 
Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (1998) 
(“Both tort and criminal law take as a significant objective the prevention of socially undesirable 
conduct.”). 
 67. See e.g. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. A (1998) (“On the premise 
that tort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety incentives, imposing strict liability on 
manufacturers … encourages greater investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-based 
liability …  The emphasis is on creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety 
in designing and marketing products.”). 
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punish wrongdoers.68  Thus, civil damages compensate the plaintiff but are 
inadequate to punish the defendant; they perform limited deterrent 
functions and are not designed to rehabilitate the defendants.  In other 
words, civil law fails to punish automobile manufacturers for designing and 
marketing dangerous vehicles. 
This ignores the role that punitive damages play in civil liability.69  
Punitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant when his conduct is 
particularly egregious.70  The question becomes whether punitive damages 
adequately serve the retribution function.71  Awarding punitive damages 
has become increasingly difficult.  Punitive damage awards are rare and 
typically small.72  In addition, in many jurisdictions there are caps on 
awarding punitive damages enacted as part of tort reform, including 
Alabama’s code.73  Moreover, the Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,74 supported limiting the amount of 
punitive damages by placing a cap on the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages.75  In this landscape, arguably, punitive damages 





 68. As will be discussed below, criminal law also serves deterrent and rehabilitative functions.  See 
infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text. 
 69. See generally Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as 
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009). 
 70. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996) (“Punitive damages may properly be 
imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its 
repetition”).  See also Benjamin J. McMichael, Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damages: 
Ambiguous Effects and Inconsistent Justifications, 66 VAND. L. REV. 961, 962 (2013) (describing 
punitive damages as intended to “punish reprehensible conduct and to deter future bad acts”).  Punitive 
damages also serve a deterrent function.  Paul B. Taylor, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by 
Applying the Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis when Punitive Damages are Sought, 16 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 769, 771 (1993) (“punitive damages are generally justified on the grounds that they provide 
an added penalty that deters defendants from causing future harm”). 
 71. See Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive 
Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 225–28 (2006). 
 72. Frank J. Vandall, Should Manufacturers and Sellers of Lethal Products be Subject to Criminal 
Prosecution?, 17 WIDENER L.J. 877, 890 (2008) (“They occur in three percent of cases and usually 
range from $30,000 to $40,000”). 
 73. See American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform 
[https://perma.cc/QYZ7-BKTW] (providing an overview of state statutes on punitive damages). 
 74. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
 75. Rather than set an absolute cap, the court made clear that the most relevant factor in 
determining the appropriate ratio was the degree of reprehensibility.  Id. at 418–19.  However, it is clear 
punitive damage awards that are greater than single digits will likely not pass constitutional muster.  Id. 
at 425. 
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B. THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 
The failure of civil law as an adequate remedy lead to the creation of 
NHTSA.76  The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 
(“Vehicle Safety Act”)77 created the NHTSA and charged it with the task of 
reducing deaths and injuries stemming from automobile crashes.  To 
accomplish this objective, the NHTSA was given the power to set motor 
vehicle safety standards and conduct safety research.78  The agency can 
promulgate federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) to set 
minimum performance standards for vehicle components that affect the 
safe operation of the vehicle (e.g., brakes, tires) and those that protect 
drivers and passengers in the event of an accident (e.g., seat belts, 
airbags).79  These standards need only be “practicable,” stated in “objective 
terms” and “meet the need for motor vehicle safety.”80  Moreover, the 
agency has the power to recall defective vehicles.81 
Each year, the NHTSA receives over 30,000 complaints from 
consumers who believe that their car is defective or fails to meet a 
FMVSS.82  Car manufacturers are required to notify the NHTSA of any 
“defect. . . related to motor vehicle safety”83  and to remedy any such 
defects without charge to the consumer.84  Such notification must be 
submitted within a reasonable period of time after a defect in a vehicle has 
 
 76. Government safety regulation has been credited with serving in parallel with tort liability. See 
e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Dialogue with the Designers: Comparative Influences on Products Design 
Norms Imposed by Regulators and by the Third Restatement of Products Liability, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 
655, 655 (1999) (“The common law tort system and the government safety regulation system serve as 
parallel and protective deterrents, encouraging safer design of products.”). 
 77. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 
(1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30169 (2012)).  See Reynolds, supra note 64, at 
124 where he terms the Vehicle Safety Act as the “bedrock of the auto safety regulatory regime”). 
 78. Finch, supra note 21, at 484; Haroon H. Hamid, The NHTSA’s Evaluation of Automobile Safety 
Systems: Active or Passive?, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 227, 230 (2007). 
 79. Ezroj, supra note 1, at 474-75.  Kevin M. McDonald, Don’t tread on me: Faster than a tire 
blowout, Congress passes wide-sweeping legislation that treads on thirty-five year old Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2001).  The NHTSA primarily fulfills its mandate through the 
use of recalls rather than by promulgating safety standards.  For example, the FMVSS do not address 
any of the specific systems that failed in the case of GM’s ignition switch.  They do not impose 
requirements with respect to ignition switches, stalls, airbag deployment, or power steering systems. 
Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 30. 
 80. Jerry L. Marshaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration and 
Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 176 (2015). 
 81. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30,118-20 (A)(2012). 
 82. Finch, supra note 21, at 484.  Despite the large number of complaints, it is estimated that 
vehicle failure accounts for approximately 2.4% of accidents.  Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 79, at 178 
(citing a study conducted by the NHTSA).  However, recall the number of injuries and deaths from 
automobile accidents each year.  In 2015 alone, there were 6,296,000 accidents accounting for 
2,443,000 injuries and 25,000 deaths. NHTSA Statistics, supra note 2. 
 83. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118 (c)(1) (2012). 
 84. McDonald, supra note 78, at 1166. 
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been determined to be safety related.  A defect is defined as a “defect in 
performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or 
motor vehicle equipment.”85  Moreover, such defect is deemed to be safety-
related if it presents “an unreasonable risk of accidents.”86  If a 
“significant” number of vehicles in a class of vehicles has failed in the 
normal operation of the vehicle, there is said to be a defect in that class of 
vehicle.87  Once the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
determines that certain vehicles contain either a product related defect or 
fail to meet a FMVSS, the Secretary may order remedial measures.88  The 
DOT is given broad powers to investigate and manufacturers are required 
to maintain information  and produce it when requested,89 and can be 
compelled to answer questions under oath.90  If the Secretary determines 
that there is a violation, he may refer the matter to the Attorney General 
who may bring an enforcement action to recover civil penalties and/or 
injunctive relief.91 
In 2000, the Vehicle Safety Act was amended by the Transportation 
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD).  
In large part, TREAD was a response to perceived deficiencies in the way 
the NHTSA handled the Ford/Firestone events of the late 1990s.92 TREAD 
was intended to “improve and strengthen the Secretary’s ability to detect 
and investigate defects.”93  In addition to increased reporting requirements, 
TREAD increased the civil penalties from $1000 to $5000 for each 
violation and increased the penalties for a series of violations from 
$800,000 to $15 million.94  Moreover, TREAD provided for criminal 
penalties where a person violated the reporting requirements with the 
intention of misleading the NHTSA with regards to safety-related defects 
that have caused death or serious bodily harm.95  Note that the increased 
penalties are for failure to comply with the notice and reporting 
requirements imposed by TREAD; neither civil nor criminal penalties are 
imposed by TREAD for marketing a dangerous car. 
Unfortunately, NHTSA is also inadequate for several reasons.  While 
 
 85. 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (a)(2)(1994). 
 86. See id. § 30102(a)(8). 
 87. McDonald, supra note 79, at 1168. 
 88. 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (b)(2) (1994). 
 89. Id. § 30166(c). 
 90. Id. § 30166(f). 
 91. Id. § 30163. 
 92. See generally McDonald, supra note 79, for a discussion of the Ford/Firestone event and 
subsequent adoption of the TREAD Act. 
 93. S. Rep. No. 106-423, at 1 (2000). 
 94. Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 5 (a), 114 Stat. 1800, 1803-04 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S. C. §§ 
30165(a) (2012)(civil penalties). 
 95. Id. at § 30170. 
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the NHTSA sets standards with respect to automobile safety, it does not 
review car designs or products to assure that the cars are safe.  In the early 
years of NHTSA history, the agency attempted to impose performance 
standards upon the industry.  This was met with political and judicial 
opposition.  After this early attempt at dictating safety standards, the 
agency, instead embraced the recall as the primary way in which it acts to 
achieve its mission.96  If a car is found to pose an unreasonable threat to 
vehicle safety, the NHTSA orders a product recall.97  In the years 1966 
through 1999, there were 7200 recalls involving over 259 million vehicles; 
the majority which were voluntarily initiated by manufacturers.98  In 2014, 
automobile manufacturers recalled 64 million vehicles.99  GM itself had to 
recall over 40 million cars.100  This approach to product safety does little to 
assure that the vehicles sold are safe.  In fact, the sheer number of recalls 
provides some evidence that they are not.101  Moreover, the sheer volume of 
deaths and injuries from automobile accidents should give us pause. 
The NHTSA fails to adequately protect consumers and ensure 
automobile safety for several reasons.102  First, they lack sufficient legal 
 
 96. Mashaw and Harfst describe three phases of NHTSA regulatory emphasis.  Initially, the 
NHTSA engaged in rule-making in which they issued performance standards.  The agency then 
switched its focus to recalls.  As Mashaw and Harfst describe it the agency has now engaged in rule-
making once more.  But, the focus of rule-making is not on dictating performance standards.  Instead, it 
seeks to encourage the “diffusion of safety technologies the industry [is] already incorporating, or 
planning to incorporate, … in nearly all of new vehicles.”  Marshaw & Harfst, supra note 80, at 172.  
Moreover, the regulations set forth by the NHTSA can best be characterized as “minimal in nature.”  
Robinson & Calcagnie, supra note 56, at 33. 
 97. See Ezroj, supra note 1, at 476-79 (outlining the recall process).  See also Reynolds, supra note 
64, at 124 where he concludes that most recalls “were preceded by defect-related litigation.” 
 98. McDonald, supra note 78, at 1170.  See McDonald at 1169-70 (detailing the rise in the number 
of recalls.)  He opines that while there is no single cause to explain the increase in recalls, it might be in 
part due to the pressure to increase production to meet demand and the proliferation of new models.  
Automobile manufacturer action and NHTSA response to accidents and deaths caused by distracted 
driving provides an illustration of this approach.  Rather than mandate a technological solution (plug-in 
devices that disable cell phone use while the car is moving), the NHTSA has mounted a public relations 
campaign to discourage distracted driving.  See Mashaw & Harfst, infra note 100, at 264-66 discussing 
NHTSA initiatives. 
 99. This figure is about 45 percent of all passenger cars registered in 2012!  Steinzor, supra note 4, 
at 443.  See also Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 82, at 173 (“[I]n recent years, NHTSA has recalled more 
vehicles than are sold new in the United States”). 
 100. AP, supra note 55. 
 101. Mashaw and Harfst conclude that the “NHTSA is now predominately a provider of consumer 
safety information …, an enforcer of implied warranties (product recalls), a codifier of industry 
practice, a broker of voluntary agreements, and a promotor of best practices and guidelines.”  Mashaw 
& Harfst, supra note 80, at 172.  They conclude, “we are doubtful that a strategy based increasingly ion 
information provision and voluntary commitments from industry will meet the need for automobile 
safety envisioned by the 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act.”  Id. at 261. 
 102. See Steinzor, supra note 4, at 445446 (“Although the regulatory system was intended to 
prevent such deadly outcomes, it has failed, and will continue to be dysfunctional until Congress gives 
NHTSA significantly stronger legal authority and much more money”).  See also id. at 446 (“The 
agency’s bewildered, even feckless responses to Toyota’s sudden acceleration problems, GM’s 
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authority.  As noted above, their primary recourse is the recall which is 
typically voluntary.  They lack authority to require that automobile 
manufactures use safe designs.  Professors Marshaw and Harfst, in their 
seminal work The Struggle for Auto Safety,103 describe how early in the 
history of the NHTSA, the agency ceded the option of writing preventative 
rules and instead adopted the recall as the primary enforcement 
mechanism.104  Most of the recalls are voluntary, the result of extensive 
negotiations between the auto manufacturer and the NHTSA.105  In 
addition, civil penalties are capped at $105 million for late reporting of 
defects.106 
Second, they lack sufficient resources.  Their entire budget was $830 
million for fiscal year 2015.107  Most of their budget is spent on public 
relations campaigns against drunk driving (and now distracted driving); 
little, if any, of this money is spent on assuring safe designs.108  The Office 
of Defects Investigation, had a staff of only fifty-one people in 2014.109  
Moreover, arguably, they lack  expertise.110  NHTSA response to the 
Toyota sudden acceleration case provides a useful example.  Instead of 
working internally to determine the cause of the sudden acceleration 
(whether  it was the floor mats, the sticky acceleration pedal or a more 
serious problem with the car’s computer system), the NHTSA referred the 
question to NASA.111  Perhaps this was because there was not a single 
electrical or software engineer on the NHTSA staff.112 
Third, some argue that they are subject to industry capture and fail to 
 
defective ignition switches, and Takata’s air bag fiasco have brought the agency back to the forefront of 
public attention in what can only be described as a disgrace.”). 
 103. JERRY L. MARSHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
 104. See also Steinzor, supra note 4, at 447 where she concludes that the NHTSA “shifted instead to 
recalls to ameliorate the effects of safety defects rather than trying to forestall them through 
preventative rules.”  Marshaw and Harfst argue that the shift from a rules-based approach to a recall 
strategy “signaled the abandonment of [NHTSA’s] safety mission” (at 167) and a shift from auto safety 
regulation to “crime and punishment” (at 111).  They conclude that NHTSA changed from a “proactive 
technology forcing regulatory agency” to a “complaints bureau and prosecutor’s office.”  Id. at 111.  
They revisited this work in 2017 and concluded that recalls have “no demonstrable system effect on 
motor vehicle safety.”  Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 80, at 167. 
 105. This has led Steinzor to term the NHTSA the “cajoler-in-chief.”  Steinzor, supra note 4, at 449. 
 106. See 49 U.S.C § 30165 (2012). 
 107. National Highway Safety Traffic Safety Administration, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Overview 8 
(2015). 
 108. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 450. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 451 (“[NHTSA] cannot afford to hire adequate technical staff ….”).  
See also Reynolds, supra note 65, at 156 (“NHTSA also fails to be an effective investigator because it 
does not have the capacity to understand the data it does collect”). 
 111. Steinzor concludes that this “confirm[s] the worst suspicions that the agency was incompetent 
with respect to this central aspect of automobile design and construction.”  Steinzor, supra note 4, at 
448. 
 112. Finch, supra note 21, at 489. 
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adequately police the industry.113  Professor Steinzor outlines the “steady 
migration of NHTSA officials to the far better compensated ranks of the 
car companies’ technical and public relations staff” and argues this trend 
“cannot help but blunt NHTSA’s regulatory instincts.”114  Clarence Ditlow, 
an American automotive safety consumer advocate, describes the 
relationship between the NHTSA and the auto industry as “entirely too 
cozy.  They view their constituency as the auto industry and not the 
consumer.”115  Again, the Toyota case offers us a useful example.  Rather 
than using their subpoena power to obtain Toyota records, officials from 
the NHTSA traveled to Japan to meet with Toyota executives. This resulted 
in the Toyota lobbying team’s bragging about saving Toyota $100 million 
by stalling NHTSA’s efforts to obtain a voluntary recall.116 
C. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR SALE OF 
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS 
Unfortunately, the scheme outlined above has all too often failed to 
bring about an adequate level of automobile safety.  The Toyota and GM 
cases highlight the need to consider criminal liability for selling dangerous 
products, especially when they cause death or serious injury.  In fact, there 
has been a recent increase in calls for criminal liability, both corporate and 
individual, in product liability cases. 
1.  Public Policy Objectives of Criminal Law 
The public policy objectives of civil and criminal liability overlap to 
some extent, but there are important differences.  One policy objective of 
the criminal law that overlaps with civil law is deterring harmful conduct.  
Deterrence may be general or specific.  Specific deterrence is aimed at the 
specific defendant who committed a crime.  A defendant may be punished 
for a criminal act to deter him from engaging in that same behavior.  
General deterrence is aimed at the whole society.  A defendant may be 
punished for a criminal act because it deters others  from engaging in that 
same behavior in the future.117  As we have seen, tort law is intended, in 
 
 113. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 451. 
 114. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 451. 
 115. Eric Lichtblau & Bill Vlasic, Safety Agency Scrutinized as Toyota Recall Grows, N.Y. TIMES, 
( Feb. 9, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/business/10safety.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/YXM9-EJ78]. 
      116.  Peter Valdes-Dapena, Toyota: Saved $100 million dodging recall, CNN MONEY (Feb. 22, 
2010, 11:46 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2010/02/21/autos/toyota_document/index.htm [https://perma. 
cc/F2EX-C7MZ]. 
 117. Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an Affirmative Defense to 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 54 (2012); Andrew Weissmann, A New 
Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1319, 1325 (2007). 
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part, to deter injurious behavior,118 which in the context of this article, is 
making and selling dangerous vehicles.  The regulatory system of recalls 
administered by NHTSA likewise is intended, in part, to deter the same 
behavior.119  In light of the GM and Toyota cases, it is apparent that the 
deterrent effect of both types of law is inadequate.  This makes it 
appropriate to look to criminal law to provide a significant, additional 
deterrent, both specific and general.  Arguably, criminal law, with its broad 
array of punishments—ranging from minor to severe—should be able to 
deter more effectively than either tort law or regulatory law.  In a case of 
corporate wrongdoing, imposing criminal liability upon the corporation is 
designed to deter corporate employees from engaging in misconduct and, at 
the same time, provide an incentive for those in positions of power to 
properly monitor their subordinates.120 
The unique features of the criminal sanction come into view when we 
move beyond deterrence.  A second public policy goal of criminal law is 
rehabilitation.  Rehabilitation seeks to change the convicted defendant in 
such a way that he will not be inclined to engage in wrongful behavior.  In 
the corporate context, rehabilitation is based on the belief that imposing 
criminal sanctions can encourage a corporation to change its corporate 
culture, among other things.121  Here, the focus is on what steps the 
corporation can take to insure similar wrongdoing is unlikely to occur in 
the future.  Most corporations already have compliance programs in place.  
Rehabilitation asks the corporation to explore why such programs failed.  
In the case of continued or systemic violations despite the presence of a 
compliance program, criminal prosecution can mandate or encourage the 
type of change needed in corporate culture and, thus, fulfill the 
rehabilitative goal of criminal law. 
Another public policy goal that sets criminal law apart from civil law 
is the ability of the criminal sanction to incapacitate the defendant and 
deny him the opportunity to engage in criminal behavior in the future.122  In 
the case of an individual, incapacitation is typically accomplished by 
 
 118. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
 119. The substantial costs of a vehicle recall give manufacturers an incentive to design and 
manufacture safe cars in the first place. 
 120. Deterring agent misconduct has been termed the “enduring policy behind criminally punishing 
corporations.”  G. R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Workable 
Integration of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
253, 268 (2011). 
 121. Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability: 
Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2009). 
 122. GEORGE COLE,  CHRISTOPHER SMITH, & CHRISTINA DEJONG, 46668 THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (14th ed. 2015).  See also, e.g., Owens, E., More Time, Less Crime? Estimating 
the Incapacitative Effects of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551 (2009). 
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incarceration.123  Simply put, however inclined a person might be to 
commit criminal acts against the public in the future, they cannot do so 
while they are locked inside a prison or jail cell.  In the case of a corporate 
defendant, the conventional view holds that a corporation cannot be 
incarcerated.  A corporation is an abstract entity and, as such, cannot be put 
behind bars.  However, imprisonment does not exhaust the possible ways in 
which incapacitation can be accomplished with respect to a corporate 
offender.  There are several other sanctions that are rarely discussed, let 
alone imposed, with respect to a corporation.  These include suspension of 
a business license in a specific state, suspension of the corporate charter, 
temporary or permanent debarment of a corporation with respect to 
government contracts, and the most serious sanction: revocation of the 
corporation charter.  Including these sanctions in the array of corporate 
punishments will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the criminal law in 
dealing with corporations that manufacture and sell dangerous products. 
Finally, perhaps the central public policy goal of the criminal law is 
retribution.124  Retributive theories justify punishment based on the idea of 
just deserts.  The defendant deserves to be punished because they 
committed a wrongful act, one that was harmful to society.  Here, criminal 
law provides something that is absent entirely from both tort law and the 
regulatory recalls, namely, society’s moral condemnation of the 
defendant.125  Some scholars have argued that what sets criminal liability 
apart from imposition of civil liability is the “moral scorn and 
condemnation that only criminal punishment entails.”126  Criminal penalties 
are imposed to express a moral judgment or condemnation about the actors’ 
conduct.127  This moral condemnation, which sets criminal law apart from 
both civil law and regulatory regimes such as the one under the Vehicle 
Safety Act, makes it an essential part of the solution to the problem of 
 
 123. Some forms of community corrections would also have the effect of incapacitating an offender. 
 124. Michael Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated 
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1311, 131617 (2000) (viewing the goals of 
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation as social or utilitarian goals and, thus, different from the 
goal of retribution).  See also generally KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 
(1990). 
 125. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 4449 (1997). 
 126. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 
(1958). 
 127. William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of 
Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2000) (“[O]nly criminal punishment involves 
expressing moral censure and moral condemnation.”); Andrew Weissmann, supra note 116, at 1324 
(“Criminal law, after all, is reserved for conduct that we find so repugnant as to warrant the severest 
sanction.”).  Imposition of punishment upon a corporation can be problematic.  To what extent can one 
judge the intent, action and voluntariness of a corporate entity?  In other words, is the corporate entity 
deserving of punishment for the actions of an individual employee? 
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dangerous vehicles and the deaths and injuries they cause.  Criminal 
penalties should be appropriate when the conduct at issue is so 
reprehensible that it deserves public retribution.128 
In the case of individual wrongdoing, retribution is achieved through a 
variety of punishments, including a monetary fine, community corrections, 
incarceration, and, for serious crimes, death.  In the case of corporate 
crime, retribution typically is achieved through assessment of a fine on the 
corporation,129 but as suggested above regarding corporate incapacitation, 
there are other possible and arguably more effective punishments that can 
express society’s moral condemnation. 
It is noteworthy that the public policy goals of criminal law, at least 
from a traditional perspective, do not include compensation for the victim 
of the crime.  Criminal penalties may be necessary to promote vehicle 
safety, to deter the wrongful conduct, and to punish when that conduct is so 
reprehensible that it deserves public retribution.  However, when traditional 
criminal penalties, including monetary fines, are imposed on a guilty 
defendant, the injured victims are not compensated.130  In other words, 
Toyota might agree to pay $1.2 billion as a penalty, but none of that money 
is earmarked to compensate the victims.  Not one penny of that money goes  
to pay medical expenses or to compensate for lost wages.  We believe that 
this shortcoming can be remedied by taking a more contemporary approach 
to criminal sanctions. 
2.  Individual Criminal Liability  
 a. Individual Criminal Liability Under State Law131 
Most criminal law is state law.132  Most state criminal statutes address 
street crime or common crime, but some are aimed at malfeasance in a 
business context.  While many of these statutes deal with financial crimes, 
 
 128. See Patrick Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability for Injuries and Death, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1091, 1095 (1992) (Imposing criminal liability upon corporations “for acts that threaten or adversely 
affect the lives of workers and consumers indicates a growing awareness that injuries and deaths 
resulting from marketing knowingly defective products and from willful violations of health, safety, and 
environmental laws are no different than injuries and deaths produced by violent street crimes.”). 
 129. Friedman, supra note 19; Kircher, supra note 121. 
 130. The traditional justification for this is that criminal law protects the public and a criminal 
offense is against the public even though there may be an identifiable victim.  Of course, a criminal 
prosecution and imposing of a criminal sanction did not preclude the victim from seeking compensation 
in a civil action against the person who caused the injuries. 
 131. Because of the limited scope of corporate criminal liability, some have argued for individual 
criminal liability in the case of automobile safety.  See e.g., Steinzor, supra note 4, at 446 
(“[I]ndividuals with the power to establish early warning systems and repair defects quickly must 
perceive a personal threat if they do not act”). 
 132. See Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal 
Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1 (2012). 
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there are a few state criminal statutes that can be used to impose liability on 
individuals employed by corporations and who share responsibility for the 
company’s manufacture and sale of dangerous products.  Foremost is a 
reckless homicide statute.  These laws generally make it a crime to 
“consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that causes a 
death.133  In a prosecution under this statute the issues typically include the 
nature of the risk, the defendant’s awareness of the risk, and the nature of 
the defendant’s actions considering that risk.  Although there has not been 
any judicial determination of the facts of either the GM case or the Toyota 
case, based on the Valukas report134 it is reasonable to believe that a 
prosecutor could make a case for reckless homicide against employees at 
various levels in both GM and Toyota. 
In addition to reckless homicide, obstruction of justice statutes, which 
“protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by imposing criminal 
penalties for lying to the government, destroying evidence, or interfering 
with witnesses or juries,”135 may be relevant in the GM case, particularly 
with respect to the actions of GM’s lawyers.  If they had knowledge of the 
dangerousness of the ignition switch and “continued to countenance both 
their clients’ failure to notify NHTSA and their misleading assurances to 
the agency that GM was dealing appropriately with faulty ignition 
switches,”136 a prosecutor could make a case for obstruction of justice. 
 
 b. Individual Criminal Liability Under Federal Law 
Although the scope of federal criminal law is more narrow than state 
criminal law, there are some relevant statutes.  The federal obstruction of 
justice statutes137 are essentially the same as their state counterparts and 
would apply under basically the same circumstances.  In addition to 
possible obstruction of justice, federal mail fraud138 and wire fraud139 
statutes are potentially relevant in cases such as GM and Toyota.  In fact, in 
both the Toyota and GM cases, the DOJ based their case on wire fraud and 
the manufacturer’s assertions that the cars were safe when they knew they 
were not.  These statutes do not impose criminal liability on the 
manufacture for sale of dangerous products.  Instead, they prohibit the 
 
 133. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 46465. 
 134. Valukas Report, supra note 35. 
 135. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 464. 
 136. Id. 
 137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2012). 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
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“misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.”140  Arguably, these 
statutes can be used to prosecute an individual who uses mail or electronic 
means to communicate that a vehicle is safe when it is not. 
The federal statute that is most directly related to the manufacture or 
sale of dangerous automobiles is the TREAD Act.141  Recall that this Act 
imposes an affirmative duty on automobile manufacturers to report any 
defect to the NHTSA and imposes criminal liability for failure to do so.  
Arguably, enactment of the TREAD Act reflects Congress’s judgment that 
existing tort law and administrative remedies were inadequate to ensure 
automobile safety and needed to be supplemented with an alternative 
sanctioning mechanism.  Under TREAD, the only basis for individual or 
corporate criminal liability is failure to notify.  Significantly, it does not 
make the manufacture or sale of a dangerous vehicle a federal crime.  
Nevertheless, it is plausible that a federal prosecutor could make a case 
against some individuals in these two companies for a TREAD Act 
violation. 
 c. Problems with Individual Criminal Liability Under State and 
Federal Law 
There are several problems with the current state of individual liability 
under both state and federal law that significantly undermine their efficacy 
in reducing deaths and injuries from dangerous vehicles.  First and 
foremost, a very significant problem with individual criminal liability is the 
absence of any statute that specifically makes the manufacture or sale of a 
dangerous product a criminal offense.  It is not a crime to design, 
manufacture or sell a dangerous vehicleeven with knowledge of the 
defect and danger to public safety.142  The only basis for individual criminal 
liability under the TREAD Act is failure to notify, but this reporting 
violation is very different from the underlying wrongful act of 
manufacturing and selling a dangerous vehicle.  Theoretically, an 
automobile executive could report to NHTSA that a particular model is 
dangerous and then go ahead with marketing that model without being 
subject to criminal liability under federal law. 
It is noteworthy that the federal criminal code does include statutes 
that prohibit placing other types of dangerous products into interstate 
commerce or the U.S. mail.  Examples include placing adulterated 
 
 140. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 3 (1999). 
 141. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text where this statute is briefly discussed. 
 142. It might be possible to bring a case based on state negligent homicide laws where one 
knowingly markets a dangerous car that leads to death.  While Steinzor asserts that there is a “long 
tradition of punishing reckless homicide,” few, if any cases can be found where this claim was 
successful against an automobile manufacturer.  Steinzor, supra note 4, at 446. 
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pharmaceuticals into interstate commerce.143  It is also a federal crime to 
place child pornography into interstate commerce.144  It is difficult to find a 
logical explanation for why Congress would prohibit these items from 
interstate commerce but not dangerous vehicles, especially when the risk of 
serious harm is known. 
An individual could be prosecuted under a state reckless homicide 
statute for selling a dangerous vehicle, but such prosecutions are 
exceedingly rare.  No individuals have been prosecuted under these statutes 
in the Toyota or GM cases.  An individual could be prosecuted under 
federal mail and wire fraud statutes, but no individuals have been 
prosecuted under these statutes in the Toyota and GM cases.  Similarly, an 
individual could be prosecuted under state or federal obstruction of justice 
statutes, but no such prosecutions have taken place in the Toyota or GM 
cases. 
A second problem with using criminal law to attach liability to 
individual wrongdoers involves identifying those individual wrongdoers in 
the corporate setting.  Traditionally, the criminal sanction has been limited 
to wrongful conduct that is egregious, that is, conduct most deserving of 
moral condemnation by society.  Defendants are punished for intentionally 
engaging in wrongful behavior, knowing or being deliberately indifferent 
to the consequences or risks of their actions.  This mental state, known as 
mens rea or the guilty mind, is an essential element of most crimes.145  
Under the concept of mens rea, a defendant who committed a criminal act 
in a careless or negligent manner does not deserve to be criminally 
punished.146  In a criminal case, the prosecutor must prove that the 
defendant had the requisite state of mind at the time he committed the 
criminal act.  In many cases of white-collar crime this is not problematic.  
White-collar crime is successfully prosecuted on a regular basis, especially 
in federal court.147  In some organizational settings, however, with 
extensive specialization of labor,148 it is not uncommon for decision making 
to be widely dispersed and be separated from the task or tasks of carrying 
out the decision.  Often, those who carry out a decision are not the same 
 
 143. 21 U.S.C §§ 331, 351 (2012). 
 144. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).  
 145. During the course of the 20th century we can observe the rise of so-called strict liability 
crimes.  These crimes typically are found in administrative law.  See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Criminal Law 
§ 5.5 (6th ed. 2017).  With respect to the requirement that the criminal act and the mental state must 
occur at the same time see id. at § 6.3. 
 146. The major exception to this is the crime of negligent or reckless homicide. 
 147. See generally DAVID WEISBURD, STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING, & NANCY BODE, 
CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1991). 
 148. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002). 
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individuals who make the decision.  From a legal perspective, this can have 
the effect of separating the criminal act from the state of mind—the mens 
rea.  In an organizational setting, it is not unusual to have the individual 
who engaged in the criminal action lack the intent (or knowledge) needed 
to hold them criminally liable.  Similarly, the individual with the intent (or 
knowledge) of the wrongfulness of the action may not be the person who 
carried out the act.  Moreover, in an organizational setting the decision 
making may be widely dispersed so that it is difficult to find an individual 
who made the decision.149  In the GM case, the Valukas Report 
acknowledged that it was almost impossible to identify actual decision 
makers involved in the ignition switch design.150  The result in such a case 
is that it may be exceedingly difficult for the prosecutor to hold any 
individual in the organization criminally responsible. 
Third, the extent to which imposing criminal liability upon individual 
corporate executives creates a sufficient deterrence to some extent depends 
upon several factors.  Deterrence of individual wrongdoing is not 
problematic in theory.  Large fines should deter, except for the very 
wealthy.  In that case, incarceration, even for a short period of time, should 
provide adequate deterrence.  Social science literature supports this.151  
Other, more creative punishments such as community corrections, 
attending classes on the environment or other appropriate topic, combined 
with fines and a short period of incarceration could also work.  For the less 
wealthy, large fines should deter, but other punishments, such as short 
periods of incarceration or community service, could effectively 
 
 149. General Motors identified 15 individuals who were at least partially at fault for the defect and 
terminated their employment.  Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect over Fatal Defect, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2014.  The Valukas Report faults Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer responsible for the 
development and manufacture of switches used by GM in their compact models.  Valukas Report, supra 
note 35.  See also Steinzor, supra note 4, at 455-57 (outlining DeGiorgio’s involvement in a section 
entitled “DeGiorgio Goes Under the Bus”).  Arguably, these individuals’ actions and mental state might 
be enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement.  Steinzor argues that certain individuals might have the 
requisite knowledge to meet the mens rea requirement.  Steinzor, supra note 4, at 459 (“[T]he three 
champions should, at the very least, be considered key targets in any such investigation.  How much 
they knew about why other executives thought the problem demanded the appointment of a champion 
and the reasons why they failed to respond to the urgent request that they serve as one could indicate the 
kind of willful blindness that can demonstrate mens rea in a criminal case”). 
 150. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 255  
The Cobalt Ignition Switch issue passed through an astonishing number of committees.  
We repeatedly heard from witnesses that they flagged the issue, proposed a solution, and 
the solution died in a committee or with some other ad hoc group exploring the issue.  
But determining the identity of any actual decision-maker was impenetrable.  No single 
person owned any decision.  Indeed, it was often difficult to determine who sat on the 
committees or what they considered … 
 151. See, e.g., Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, & Melissa Rorie, What Works? A Systematic 
Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 387 (2016). 
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supplement such fines.152  If there is a problem, it is that sentences are too 
lenient.  If that is the case, is it due to the attitudes of judges or to 
sentencing guidelines, or to insufficient degree and type of punishments 
specified in the relevant statutes?  If it is the attitudes of the judges, the 
sentencing guidelines can be modified or mandatory punishments added to 
the statutes.  If punishments specified in the statute are too lenient, that can 
be remedied by legislation, which will at the same time reduce the judges’ 
discretion. 
A related matter regarding individual liability of corporate executives 
is the problem of indemnification.  If managers are indemnified for any 
amounts of money they must pay as a criminal fine, there is insufficient 
deterrent.  It is not clear whether indemnification could be legally 
prohibited.  It is possible, but this problem points to a better solution: 
incarceration coupled with community corrections, or other punishments in 
which the burden cannot be shifted to others.  As much as they might wish 
otherwise, a wealthy corporate executive would not be able to send a low-
level employee to prison in his place. 
Fourth, a review of existing laws shows that to some extent a gap in 
the law is a contributing factor in the problem of injuries and death caused 
by dangerous vehicles.  The gap in federal law, which fails to criminalize 
the knowing placement of a dangerous vehicle into interstate commerce, is 
especially glaring.  Repairing this gap by enacting a new federal statute 
prohibiting placing dangerous vehicles into interstate commerce will be 
discussed below.  However, enacting new criminal statutes will not be 
adequate to remedy the problem of vehicle safety.  The statutes that are on 
the books are not being enforced by prosecutors in cases of dangerous 
vehicles.  Even when there are adequate laws in effect, prosecutions are 
very rare.  The reasons for this are found in an array of obstacles to 
attaching criminal liability. 
Given that prosecutors operate in an environment of resource 
constraints,153 it is easy to see why a prosecutor may decline to prosecute an 
individual in an organizational setting.  Not all cases can be prosecuted, so 
the limited resources that are available are used to prosecute the cases in 
which a conviction is easier to obtain.  This is not to suggest that white- 
collar crimes are not prosecuted.  In fact, the opposite is the case.154  There 
are many successful prosecutions of individuals in an organizational 
setting.  However, it may partially explain why some corporate executives 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g. Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, & Relationships: Contextual 
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 154. WEISBURD, supra note 147; SCHLEGEL, supra note 124. 
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are not prosecuted and why automobile executives have not been 
prosecuted.  Federal prosecutors typically have more resources at their 
disposal than local prosecutors have.  Still, they are operating under an 
environment of resource constraints.  This may push them to focus on cases 
that are easier to prosecute and away from corporate executives who are 
more difficult to prosecute. 
Beyond resource constraints, there may be political and sociological 
reasons why  prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute corporate executives.155  
Local prosecutors throughout the country, with rare exceptions, are elected 
officials.156  As such they will inevitably be connected to local politics.  The 
executives of corporations that have local presence would typically be 
politically connected as well.  These executives and the prosecutor may 
belong to the same political party, belong to the same service organizations 
such as Rotary or Kiwanis, and belong to the same social circles and even 
be personal friends.  Any of these connections may influence a prosecutor’s 
decision on whether to prosecute an executive, even though doing so might 
entail a conflict of interest. 
Even if the local prosecutor has no connection with a corporate 
executive, the corporation itself may have a substantial local presence.  It 
may employ large numbers of local people, have supply chain links with 
local vendors, and have a long history of local philanthropy with financial 
support of local museums, youth sports teams, as well as local arts and 
cultural events.  The political fallout of bringing a criminal case against the 
executives of such a corporation could make a local prosecutor decide to 
devote their limited resources to prosecuting other cases.  While federal 
prosecutors are appointed and, therefore, may not have the same local 
political connections that a county prosecutor has, they may nevertheless be 
socially connected with corporate executives, and such connections may 
have the same degree of influence on the decision to prosecute that they do 
 
 155. Stemen & Frederick, supra note 153.  Unfortunately, there is no empirical research on the 
question of why federal prosecutors decide to prosecute or not prosecute.  RINA STEINZOR, WHY NOT 
JAIL? 169 (2015).  Two empirical studies on state prosecutors point to lack of resources as a major 
factor in the decision to not prosecute.  Kenneth A. Ayers Jr. & James Frank, Deciding to Prosecute 
White-Collar Crime: A National Survey of State Attorneys General, 4 JUST. Q. 425 (1987); Michael L. 
Benson et al, District Attorneys and Corporate Crime: Surveying the Prosecutorial Gatekeepers, 26 
CRIMINOLOGY 505 (1988).  Jesse Eisinger examines the motivations of United States Department of 
Justice attorneys regarding the decision to bring criminal cases against corporate executives.  EISINGER, 
supra note 23. 
 156. Prosecution of state criminal cases can be at the local or state level.  In three states, the state 
attorney general directs all local prosecutions (Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island).  In the rest, 
prosecutions are handled by local prosecutors almost all of whom are elected officials.  GEORGE COLE, 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, & CHRISTINA DEJONG, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38788 
(14th ed. 2015). 
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with local prosecutors.157 
So, we see that local prosecutors may be reluctant to bring a criminal 
case because of personal reasons, political reasons, resource constraints, or 
legal reasons such as anticipated difficulty with proving mens rea in certain 
individuals within an organization.  A prosecutor who decides to bring a 
criminal case against a corporate executive may fail to obtain a conviction 
because of resource constraints or the mens rea problem.  These obstacles 
must be overcome for individual criminal liability to play a meaningful role 
in promoting vehicle safety.  Unless this problem is remedied, providing 
new statutory tools to prosecutors will have a negligible effect on the 
problem. 
But even if a prosecutor succeeds in convicting one or more 
individuals who committed a crime within an organizational setting, 
individual criminal liability is problematic because it lets the corporation 
“off the hook.”  Organizations are instrumental in shaping the attitudes, 
beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of individuals who work in them.  In 
some situations, they also provide the opportunity and means to commit a 
criminal act.  As a result, whether an individual is prosecuted for a crime 
within an organizational setting and whether or not an individual is 
convicted of such a crime, it is essential that the criminal liability of the 
organization itself be considered.  This will be discussed in the next two 
sections. 
 
3. Corporate Criminal Liability Under State and Federal Law 
a.  Background 
Corporate criminal liability has been an accepted part of American 
law for over a century.  In the leading case of New York Central and 
Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States,158 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that corporations can be responsible for criminal acts committed 
 
 157. In his classic study, Jack Peltason discussed the difficult time federal judges in the south 
experienced during the school desegregation cases.  Arguably, the experience of federal prosecutors 
would not be significantly different.  JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN 
FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971). 
 158. N.Y. Cen. & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. U.S. 212 U.S. 481, 495-96 (1909). 
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation 
which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be 
held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents whom it has 
entrusted authority to act. 
  Insulating corporations from criminal liability would “virtually take away the only 
means of effectually controlling” corporations and would allow the law to “shut its eyes 
to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted 
through” corporations.  Id. 
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by their employees.  The Court noted that an important justification for this 
rule is the need to control corporations, which by that time had acquired 
enormous power and the potential for inflicting substantial harm to people, 
the economy, and the environment.  That potential is much greater today.159 
A review of the specific statutes applicable to a corporation shows that 
for the most part the same statutes that potentially apply to an individual in 
a dangerous product case arguably also apply to a corporation.  Under state 
law, reckless homicide appears to be especially relevant.  As mentioned 
above with respect to individual liability, it is reasonable to believe that a 
prosecutor could make a case for reckless homicide against both GM and 
Toyota.  In addition, as in the case of individual liability, a prosecutor may 
be able to make a case for obstruction of justice against GM and Toyota for 
concealing evidence and misleading state government officials. 
With respect to federal criminal statutes, the federal obstruction of 
justice statute160 is much more relevant than its state counterparts if GM or 
Toyota officials or their lawyers lied to or mislead federal regulators 
regarding the safety issues relating to the vehicles.  In addition to possible 
federal obstruction of justice charges, the federal mail fraud161 and wire 
fraud162 statutes are potentially relevant regarding corporate liability.  As is 
the case with individual liability, these statutes do not impose criminal 
liability on a corporation for the manufacture or sale of dangerous products.  
Arguably, these statutes can be used prosecute a corporation when its 
employee uses mail or electronic means to communicate that a vehicle is 
safe when it is not.  In fact, federal mail and wire fraud statutes were the 
basis of the federal government’s threatened prosecution of Toyota that 
resulted in a DPA in 2014. 
The federal statute that is most directly related to corporate liability 
for the manufacture or sale of dangerous vehicles is the TREAD Act.163  As 
in the case of individual liability, the only basis for corporate criminal 
liability is failure to notify.  It is plausible that a federal prosecutor could 
make a case against both GM and Toyota for a TREAD Act violation.164 
For nearly as long as the corporate criminal liability doctrine been in 
effect it has been the subject of criticism and this criticism continues 
today.165  While corporate criminal liability has become widely accepted 
 
 159. SCHLEGEL, supra note 124, at 3; WEISBURD, supra note 147, at 172. 
 160. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2012). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 163. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text where we discuss the duty to notify. 
 164. For example, GM failed to notify the NHTSA within the required time period.  Statement of 
Facts GM, supra note 42. 
 165. Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Attaching Criminal Liability to Credit Reporting Agencies: Use 
of the Corporate Ethos Theory of Criminal Liability, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 176 n.34 (2014). 
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among the courts, there has been a contrary view espoused by some 
commentators who are arguing essentially for corporate criminal immunity.  
For them, this immunity typically rests on the claim that holding a 
corporation criminally liable for the acts of its employees is impossible, or 
unfair, or both.  This claim is supported by a set of arguments that are 
flawed at best or simply vacuous. 
 
b.  Problems with Corporate Criminal Liability Under State and 
Federal Law 
 
1. Gaps in the Law. 
 
Because, for the most part, the same criminal laws that apply to an 
individual also apply to a corporation, the same gaps in the statutes that we 
saw in the case of an individual defendant are present in the case of a 
corporate defendant.  In particular, the glaring gap in federal law in the case 
of an individual defendant (i.e., federal law does not prohibit selling a car 
that is known to be dangerous) persists in the case of a corporate defendant.  
There is no federal reckless homicide statute.  As in the case of an 
individual defendant, the TREAD Act does little to fill the gap because it 
punishes only reporting violations.  A company whose employees 
knowingly put a dangerous vehicle into interstate commerce can escape 
liability under the TREAD Act by simply complying with its reporting 
requirements.  Clearly, there is a need for a new federal statute that will 
give federal prosecutors the necessary tools to respond to cases like GM 
and Toyota. 
 
2.  The Mens Rea Problem. 
 
A significant impediment to successfully prosecuting any corporate 
defendant is proving mens rea.166  The basic problem is that a corporation is 
an abstract legal entity.  As such, it is not able to have a state of mind in the 
conventional sense.  Traditionally, courts have resolved this problem by 
looking at the actions and mental state of corporate employees applying the 
principle of respondeat superior to find corporate criminal liability.167  Use 
of respondeat superior to impose criminal liability upon the corporation 
 
 166. See, e.g., Patricia Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (2006). 
 167. Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 
19 J. OF LAW & POL’Y 1, 4 (2010); Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: 
Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1985). 
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has, however, been the target of intense criticism by commentators.168  
First, it is argued that the respondeat superior model fails to provide 
adequate deterrence.  Arguably, under respondeat superior, the corporation 
is incentivized to monitor and police its employees to avoid criminal 
charges.169  The typical way that corporations act to deter wrongdoing is by 
adopting corporate codes of conduct and compliance programs.  However, 
the existence of these codes and programs will not insulate the corporation 
from liability for the actions of an agent in violation of those rules.  
Therefore, it is argued that attaching liability under respondeat superior 
provides inadequate incentives for corporations to develop, implement, and 
enforce effective corporate compliance programs.170 
Second, it is argued that the model of respondeat superior fails to 
serve any real retributive function.  Recall the goal of retribution as a part 
of criminal law stems from the belief that it is proper to punish wrongdoers 
when their conduct is morally repugnant.  The problem in the case of 
respondeat superior is obvious; liability is imposed upon the corporation 
without finding the corporation morally culpable.171 
Third, utilizing the respondeat superior model promotes inconsistent 
enforcement by being both under and over-inclusive.  Some commentators 
have argued that the theory is over-inclusive, giving prosecutors too much 
discretion and forcing even innocent corporations to accept responsibility 
to avoid prosecution.172  Moreover, the doctrine is over-inclusive because 
under respondeat superior, a corporation faces liability for the actions of a 
rogue employee even when it has taken all possible steps to prevent 
misconduct.173  At the same time, the doctrine is under-inclusive because 
oftentimes prosecutors shy away from criminal prosecution to avoid 
punishing innocent shareholders and for all the reasons discussed above.  
 
 168. See e.g., Ellis & Dow, supra note 165. 
 169. Skupski, supra note 120, at 268 (describing the “enduring policy behind criminally punishing 
corporations” as one of “deterring agent misconduct by allocating risk of criminal liability to the 
corporation to incentivize greater control of its agents”). 
 170. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1437, 1441 (2009) (“[T]his standard provides no incentives for companies to expend resources to 
institute effective compliance programs.”); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking 
Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 450 (2007) (criminal corporate liability should only be 
imposed upon corporations who fail to have reasonable policies and procedures in place to prevent 
employee wrongdoing). 
 171. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1104 (1991); Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: The 
DOJ’s Internal Moral – Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7, 
10 (2011) (“[T]he current standard allows conviction of corporations when the entity has engaged in no 
morally culpable behavior.”). 
 172. See, e.g., Abril & Olazahal, supra note 166, at 113. 
 173. Kircher, supra note 121, at 159 (acknowledging that the respondeat superior doctrine fails to 
distinguish between crimes that are committed with encouragement of upper management and those 
perpetrated by a rogue employee). 
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By giving little guidance to prosecutors to determine which corporations to 
prosecute, we are left with arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement. 
Most importantly, the doctrine of respondeat superior focuses on the 
individual actor and, as such, often fails to recognize the role that corporate 
culture can play in fostering illegal conduct by its employees.174  In doing 
so, it fails to focus on the actual misconduct by the corporation.175 
3. The Mens Rea Problem Solved 
Theories that impose corporate criminal liability by focusing only on 
the individual wrongdoer’s conduct ignore the effect that the organizational 
culture can have on whether individuals within that organization are likely 
to engage in wrongdoing.  Theories that focus on the actions of one 
individual fail to recognize that often organizational wrongdoing cannot be 
easily traced to action by one individual.  GM provides an example of this 
difficulty.  Although DeGiorgio is one clearly identifiable culpable 
individual, other engineers, managers, and lawyers also played a role and it 
is impossible to identify exactly who.176  This is true because often 
corporate behavior is made up of many small actions by disconnected 
individuals which when aggregated become unethical or illegal conduct.177  
The corporate ethos theory addresses those shortfalls by emphasizing the 
role corporate culture plays.178 
Under the corporate ethos theory attention is paid to factors that 
comprise corporate culture, imposing liability on a corporation when the 
corporate culture created “an environment or a demonstrable personality 
that encouraged the violation.”179  The first aspect of corporate culture that 
is relevant to identifying the corporate ethos is its hierarchy.180  This aspect 
 
 174. James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business Firms: Social and 
Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 58 (2009). 
 175. Skupski, supra note 120, at 277 (“[T]he strict liability effect of the respondeat superior 
standard causes a failure to inquire into the genuine culpability of the corporation”). 
 176. See generally Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 255. 
  The Cobalt Ignition switch issue passed through an astonishing number of committees.  
We repeatedly heard from witnesses that they flagged the issue, proposed a solution, and 
the solution died in a committee or with some other ad hoc group exploring the issue.  
But determining the identify of any actual decision-maker was impenetrable. No single 
person owned any decision.  Indeed, it was often difficult to determine who sat on the 
committees or what they considered . . . 
 177. Fanto, supra note 172, at 26 (“[O]rganizational misconduct may also not be easily traceable to 
one bad act; rather, it is made up of small decisions or actions that may be at first ethically or legally 
equivocal and that are the bases for later decisions or actions that eventually and cumulatively are 
clearly unethical and illegal.”). 
 178. Bucy, supra note 170, at 1099.  See also Ellis & Dow, supra note 165 (comparing the 
respondeat superior model to the corporate ethos model). 
 179. Abril & Obazabal, supra note 166, at 123. 
 180. Bucy, supra note 171. 
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recognizes the role that leaders play in shaping corporate culture and 
focuses on how the actions of leaders might encourage misconduct.  In a 
strong organizational culture, the leader should pay attention to the culture 
of the corporation.  This means, among other things, that the leader should 
discuss unethical behavior by employees, punish such behavior and outline 
a plan to minimize the likelihood of such behavior occurring again.181  
Second, corporate ethos is shaped by corporate goals.182  People are 
basically obedient and when told to meet certain goals, the means of 
achieving those goals are unimportant; people are likely to achieve those 
goals by any means possible. 183  Third, corporate policies, including 
training and education programs, are an important factor in shaping the 
corporate ethos.184  It is important to note what efforts the corporation has 
taken in educating its employees about legal requirements and ethical 
expectations.  This includes adoption of mission statements, corporate 
codes of conduct, and specific training initiatives.  However, it is necessary 
to consider whether these policies are inculcated into the fiber of the 
corporation or are  mere posturing.  Fourth, the corporate ethos is defined 
in part by the monitoring mechanisms including all preventative measures 
that the corporation may have in place.185  Related to this, it is, fifth, 
important to consider how the corporation responded to allegations of 
wrongdoing in the past.  How seriously did corporate officials investigate 
these allegations?  Indifference or denial can be a sign that they have 
“recklessly tolerated” the misconduct.  It is also important to consider how 
corporate leaders responded to allegations of misconduct.  Sixth, the 
compensation scheme partly defines the corporate ethos.  This includes an 
analysis of what is rewarded and what is punished.  People act in ways that 
are rewarded and they act to avoid punishment.186  Just as importantly, 
people watch what is rewarded and what is punished in the behavior of 
others. 
 
 181. Bucy, supra note 170, at 1448. 
 182. Bucy, supra note 171, at 1133 (“whether the goals set by the corporation promote lawful 
behavior or are so unrealistic that they encourage illegal behavior”). 
 183. See generally Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations 
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Crime: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 1 2003 (arguing rewards based on achievement of goals that ignore the way of bringing 
about that achievement induce people to work to achieve goals without attention to the ethics or the 
legality of the methods used). 
 184. Bucy, supra note 171, at 1134-35. 
 185. Kircher, supra note 121, at 172. 
 186.  Linda K. Trevino & K. A. Nelson, Managing Business Ethics: Straight Talk about How to Do 
It Right (2014).  (Similarly, people will act to avoid punishment.  In the corporate setting, perhaps the 
most threatening punishment is to be fired.  People respond to rewards and incentives and watch how 
others are rewarded and punished.  It follows that if people are rewarded for “making the numbers” at 
all costs, people will act in ways to meet that goal.). 
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We can use GM to illustrate.  For 77 years, GM sold more cars than 
any other car manufacturer worldwide.  That ended in 2007 when Toyota 
overtook them in worldwide sales.187  In the early 2000’s GM was faced 
with sagging sales and unstable profits.188  In 2005, GM lost $10.6 
billion.189  In the early 2000’s, GM sought to develop a successful small car 
line to compensate for sagging sales in trucks and SUVs.190  The Cobalt, 
with the newly designed ignition switch, was GM’s reentry into the small 
car game.191  The success of the small car line was important to GM’s 
overall financial performance and to its ability to meet federal emission 
standards.  In fact, GM’s North American Strategy Board had determined 
that the success of the Cobalt was essential if GM were  to survive.192  It 
was produced on slim margins to help meet these objectives.193  Another 
way in which GM responded to its fiscal woes was in their attempts to 
reduce costs including cutting costs for individual parts and consolidation 
of the U.S. Engineering group from 11 centers to one unit.194  The corporate 
culture, thus, appeared to be one driven by the goal of increasing car sales 
and reducing costs.  The launch of the Cobalt was in response to these 
goals and it appears that there was pressure to get the car launched in a 
timely fashion.  Steinzor opines that internal pressures not to delay the 
2004 launch date of the Cobalt influenced DeGiorgio’s decision to approve 
the ignition switch even though it failed to meet GM’s specifications.195 
In its examination of the GM corporate culture, the Valukas Report 
discussed what it termed the “tone at the top.”  The message from GM 
leaders was inconsistent.  On the one hand, the message was “when safety 
is at issue, cost is irrelevant.”  At the same time, a message was conveyed 
that “cost is everything.”196  Training materials highlighted safety concerns 
and made no mention of cost as a relevant factor.197  However, the 2000’s 
were a time of cost-cutting at GM.  One engineer was quoted as saying that 
the emphasis on cost-cutting “permeates the fabric of the whole culture.”198  
 
 187. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 15. 
 188. Id. at 22. 
 189. Id. at 23. 
 190. Id. at 17. 
 191. Id. at 19. 
 192. Id. at 21. 
 193. Id. at 22. 
 194. Id. at 234. 
 195. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 454 (“But he said nothing as the new car went into production 
probably because of internal pressure not to interfere with the 2004 launch date.”). 
 196. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 249. 
 197. Id. at 249 (quoting a training presentation “[W]e are competing in a new world, one that 
demands a culture where there is not tolerance for defects at any point during in[side] the vehicle 
development and manufacturing process. Because the marketplace has zero tolerance for defects, this 
organization has no tolerance for defects.”). 
 198. Id. at 250. 
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This cost-cutting mentality impacted all aspects of the business, from 
bringing projects in on time, sourcing to the lowest bidder and to cuts in 
engineering staff.  While the ignition switch issue was presented to GM 
senior engineering management, they failed to take immediate action.  
Instead, an investigation was opened that lasted two and half years.199  
Moreover, the issue of the ignition switch was never raised with upper 
management .200  To the extent that management was aware of the issue, it  
failed to take a leadership role in  in elevating the  investigations to a more 
urgent level.201 
In fact, committee after committee reviewed the problem but no action 
was taken.202  The Valukas Report recounts the story of a junior safety 
investigation engineer who presented the issue to the committee charged 
with reviewing such matters.  The committee quickly closed the safety 
investigation without taking any action.203  The Valukas Report describes a 
culture in which “everyone had responsibility to fix the problem, [but] 
nobody took responsibility.”204  The Valukas Report concludes that there 
was a “troubling disavowal of responsibility made possible by a 
proliferation of committees.”205  It references what was called the “GM 
Salute”—where one crossed his arms and pointed outward to others to 
indicate that the decision and responsibility belonged to someone else.  The 
committee had responsibility, but “no single person bore responsibility or 
was individually responsible.”206 
Corporate culture shapes individual action within the corporation.  
Individuals conform to the behavior around them.207  At GM, this 
manifested itself in what had been termed the “GM nod” where everyone 
nods in agreement to a proposed plan of action but leaves the room and 
does nothing.”208  This tendency to conform manifested itself in a more 
significant manner when Steven Oakley, a Brand Quality Manager, 
classified the inadvertent shut-off as a convenience issue rather than a 
safety issue.  Oakley recounts how he believed the shut off to be a safety 
issue, but the Program Engineering Manager for the team and other 
 
 199. Id. at 211. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. The greater the numbers of people who participate in an action the less likely people are to feel 
a sense of individual responsibility.  John M. Darley, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion 
of Responsibility, 8 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968). 
 203. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 78. 
 204. Id. at 2. 
 205. Id. at 68. 
 206. Id. at 69, 255 (“No single person owned any decision”). 
 207. Soloman E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a 
Unanimous Majority, PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 70 (1956). 
 208. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 256. 
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engineers told him that it was merely a convenience issue and he “deferred 
to them.”209 
In addition, people exhibit confirmation bias.210  A fatal example of 
this at GM was their unwillingness to reevaluate their conclusion that the 
ignition switch defects were a convenience issue rather than a safety 
issue.211  GM personnel repeatedly failed to search for information that 
might explain the accidents and complaints from consumers.  Although 
faced with mounting evidence to the contrary, GM engineers and 
committee members refused to consider the impacts of moving stalls or to 
question the effects upon airbag deployment. 212  It is common for people to 
act this way due to escalation of commitment.213  The ignition switch was 
problematic from the start.  In fact, the engineer who approved the design 
called it the “switch from hell.”214  The prototype performed so poorly that 
it had to be totally redesigned.  Upon completion, the redesigned switch 
still failed to meet mechanical specifications for torque.  Nevertheless, it 
was approved and went into production. 
Last, fragmented knowledge within a corporate culture can impact 
decision-making.  In the case of GM, this aspect of corporate culture was 
fatal.  When GM engineers began receiving complaints that the low torque 
on the ignition switch could lead to moving stalls, they did not recognize 
this as a safety issue.  This was in part because those engineers did not 
know that other engineers had designed the car so that turning the key to 
the accessory position would disable the airbags.  The Valukas Report 
describes the “information silos” where engineers in one department of GM 
did not know what engineers in other departments were doing.  This which 
lead to the delayed response.215 
The formal culture at GM is comprised at least in part by policies that 
encourage safe design.  For example, the expectation is that GM lawyers 
who discover a safety issue elevate that issue to their superiors.216  
 
 209. Id. at 76. 
 210. The confirmation trap operates in a way that encourages individuals to look for evidence to 
confirm preexisting conclusions and to disregard information that does not support that conclusion.  
David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision-Making, 
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 1996, at 9, 19. 
 211. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 211. 
 212. Id. at 256. 
 213. Moreover, escalation of commitment makes it likely that once started down a path, even a 
dangerous path, people are unlikely to change course.  Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Understanding 
Behavior in Escalation Situations, 246 SCIENCE 216, 216 (1989). 
 214. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 5. 
 215. Id. at 33 (“Had GM personnel connected the dots and understood how their own cars were 
built, they might have addressed the safety defect before injuries and fatalities occurred.”). 
 216. Id. at 109–10 (“If you believe … that the conclusion is wrong, you should continue to seek an 
appropriate resolution.  It is your duty to bring the situation to the attention of superiors or their 
supervisors if necessary.”). 
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However, the engineer in charge of the project, Ray DeGiorgio, approved 
production of the ignition switch knowing that it failed to comply with 
GM’s specifications.  Nothing in GM policy prevented him from doing so 
and, in fact, it seems likely that no one at GM, other than DeGiorgio, even 
knew that the part failed to meet the specification.217  Unfortunately, GM 
failed to have sufficient monitoring systems in place to detect or prevent 
such action.218  One of GM’s main safety lawyers explained his defense of 
the switch saying, that he did not want to be criticized for failing to “defend 
a brand new launch.”219  According to the Valukas Report there was a 
reluctance to raising issues at GM.  When explaining this reluctance some 
pointed to their reluctance to do anything that would delay the launch, and 
some spoke to a fear of retaliation.220 
 
4. The Spillover Effect.   
   
An argument often raised by those promoting corporate immunity is 
the spillover effect, which is sometimes referred to as the innocent 
shareholder.  Those who raise this argument suggest that it goes to the 
issue of fairness.  That is, they argue that the spillover effects of a criminal 
prosecution make such a prosecution unfair.  The argument can be 
summarized in the following way.  When a corporation is prosecuted 
criminally, an array of “innocent” parties is impacted.  If the prosecution 
causes the value of the company’s shares to fall or the company goes out of 
business, this will harm the shareholders who, the argument goes, were not 
responsible for the criminal actions and did not have the means to prevent 
it.  This argument typically implies or specifies that the shareholders are a 
retired couple whose income depends in significant part on their 
investments.  Not only will the shareholders be harmed, the company’s 
employees, the employees’ families, and suppliers will also suffer.  Hence, 
it is argued that prosecuting any corporation is unfair. 
To be sure, there are collateral consequences to any criminal 
prosecution.221  However, as a justification for corporate immunity, the 
spillover effect argument completely fails.  It fails because when logically 
applied in the broader context of individual criminal defendants, we see 
 
 217. Id. at 52. 
 218. Id. at 34 (“‘[W]hile the decision to change the Ignition Switch, without changing the part 
number, violated GM’s policies, GM also failed to have in place an oversight system sufficient to 
ensure such decisions were reviewed and the correct decisions made.”). 
 219. Id. at 7. 
 220. Id. at 252. 
 221. See, e.g., Steven B. Dow, Navigating Through the Problem of Mootness in Corrections 
Litigation, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 651, 662–65 (2015); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, 
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017). 
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that it is completely vacuous.  Virtually all criminal prosecutions will have 
some spillover effects.  The people hurt by such a prosecution are often far 
more innocent than corporate shareholders.  When an individual is 
convicted of a crime and sent to prison there is a profound negative impact 
on his/her family.  Financial and other kinds of support that the defendant 
was providing to the family disappears.  This may entail a complete loss of 
income.  This loss of support can have an especially tremendous impact on 
the defendant’s children.  These children are truly innocent.  The 
shareholders made the choice of purchasing those corporate shares; the 
children did not choose their parents.  Purchasing shares of a corporation 
always entails some degree of risk.  Loss of share value is one of the many 
risks that share ownership entails.  There is no justification for 
distinguishing loss of share value that results from corporate crime from 
other types of share value loss.  Moreover, in many cases the shareholders 
will have other sources of income to rely on in the event the shares lose all 
or a substantial amount of their value.  Institutional shareholders (and many 
individual shareholders) will manage the risk of this through 
diversification.  On the other hand, in many cases the incarceration of a 
parent will deprive the defendant’s children of all financial support, which 
may result in destitution without reliance on government assistance. 
The spillover effect argument includes the claim that the shareholders 
were not responsible for the criminal act and could not have prevented it.  
They may have no legal responsibility for the crime, but it is does not 
necessarily follow that they could not have to some degree prevented it.  
Children are truly not able to prevent their parent from committing a crime.  
The same cannot be said with respect to shareholders and corporate crime.  
While the “retired couple” is often used as the example of an innocent 
shareholder, the reality is that a substantial portion of corporate shares are 
held by institutional investors.  It is widely known that they are 
sophisticated and have substantial economic clout.  They do have the 
ability to influence corporate management, and the risk of partial or total 
loss of share value gives these investors the incentive to do so. 
There are truly innocent parties significantly impacted by criminal 
convictions, but they are not the shareholders.  It is the family members, 
especially children.  There is little concern expressed about them in debates 
over sentencing policy.  The corporate apologists never express any 
concern about these truly innocent parties.  They typically are left out of 
the broader narrative on the collateral effects of conviction and punishment.  
If there were genuine concern about these innocents, should we not expect 
to find it integrated into criminal sentencing guidelines? 
The same point should be made about others impacted by the spillover 
effect.  The corporate criminal immunity argument refers to innocent 
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employees who may lose their jobs if their company is prosecuted and 
convicted.  It also cites innocent suppliers that also will incur financial loss.  
Such losses will obviously occur in some cases of corporate criminal 
prosecution, but exactly the same thing happens in many cases of 
individual criminal prosecutions.  If a physician is incarcerated for 
Medicaid fraud, his or her employees may lose their jobs.  Suppliers of the 
medical practice may incur a financial loss.  Has this resulted in lenient 
treatment of these individual defendants? 
The basic problem with the spillover effect argument is that the 
concern for the innocents is highly selective and unjustifiably so.  The fact 
of the matter is that the “innocents” who the corporate apologists focus on 
cannot be used to support corporate criminal immunity because that 
argument logically applied in the broader context of individual criminal 
liability would fundamentally undermine the use of the criminal sanction 
across the board.  If a negative impact on innocent family members—
individuals who are far more innocent than shareholders—is a justification 
for immunity from prosecution in the case of individuals, then there would 
have to be a massive reduction in such prosecutions.  Such a reduction 
would have no support as a matter of public policy.  It is highly doubtful 
that even the corporate apologists would support this sort of change. 
 
5. Corporate Fines. 
 
An issue in the corporate crime debate that is attracting more attention 
in recent years is the inadequacy of criminal fines imposed on corporations.  
Obviously, how well such fines work depends upon the size, frequency and 
likelihood of the fine being imposed.222  While it is true that in some cases 
the fines imposed on a corporation by government regulators, criminal 
court judges, or through a DPA are perceived by many to be a staggering 
amount of money, the reality is that these fines most likely have little, if 
any, deterrent effect on corporate wrongdoing because they are far too 
small.  For example, in the GM case the fine imposed under the DPA was 
$900 million.  While this sounds like an enormous amount of money, 
critics have compared this to the $156 billion in GM revenue, suggesting 
that it is woefully inadequate.223 
The most commonly voiced explanation for this is that the company 
executives see such fines merely as one of the many costs of doing 
business.  Even if the fine is perceived to be a very large amount of money, 
paying the fine has no financial impact on them personally and may have 
 
 222. Vandall, supra note 72. 
 223. See generally Schlegel, supra note 124, at 23. 
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little, if any, financial impact on the company.  The problem of inadequacy 
of fines is an important part of the proposals outlined in Part III. 
 
6.  Reluctance of Prosecutors to Bring Cases Against Corporations.   
 
In the discussion on problems with individual criminal liability we 
touched on the matter of prosecutors being reluctant to bring criminal cases 
against individual defendants.224  This is a significant problem with local 
prosecutors in state court.  There are relatively few prosecutions of white-
collar defendants in that venue.  It was suggested that this is due to a 
combination of political, sociological, and financial (i.e. lack of adequate 
resources) factors rather than any lack of statutes in the criminal code.225  
This also explains why white-collar prosecutions are more common in 
federal court, where these factors have much less influence on the decision 
to prosecute as well as on the outcome of each case. 
The hurdles that make prosecution of white-collar defendants 
problematic in state court are far more daunting when the defendant is a 
corporation.  As in a case of individual defendants, prosecutors may be 
politically and socially connected with the executives of the corporation 
that may become the subject of a criminal prosecution.  The corporation 
may be a significant local employer such that the decision to prosecute may 
entail electoral consequences for the prosecutor, nearly all of whom are 
elected officials.  Prosecuting street criminals may be perceived as 
generating political benefits and at a much lower cost.226  The problem of 
adequate resources would be much more significant when the defendant is 
a corporation.  A corporate defendant may possess enormous resources that 
can be used to overwhelm a local prosecutor, who, along with pursuing a 
case against that corporation, is responsible for prosecuting the typical 
array of street crime, domestic violence, etc.227  A local prosecutor 
contemplating bringing a case against a large, powerful corporation may 
conclude that there are not adequate resources available to prosecute that 
case and, at the same time, carry out the other, routine responsibilities of 
the office.  This theory is difficult to test because there are so few cases in 
which a local prosecutor brings a criminal case against a large corporate 
defendant.  It is especially difficult to test with respect to dangerous 
products because the only known case is one in which a local prosecutor in 
Indiana brought a reckless homicide case against Ford Motor Company for 
 
 224. See Stemen & Frederick, supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Stemen & Frederick, supra notes 153, at 153 and accompanying text. 
 226. Steinzor, supra note 155, at 463. 
 227. Id. at 6. 
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three deaths caused by a safety defect in Ford Pintos.228  Three local 
residents were burned to death after the vehicle in which they were riding 
was stuck from behind, resulting in a ruptured fuel tank and fire.  In the 
book Reckless Homicide?: Ford’s Pinto Trial,229 Lee Strobel discusses the 
case brought against Ford Motor Company based on their manufacture of 
the Pinto.  In what has been termed the “only case in American history in 
which a corporation was criminally prosecuted for knowingly marketing a 
dangerously defective product,”230  Ford was charged with three counts of 
reckless homicide.  The primary account of this case suggests that the 
prosecutor was overwhelmed by the defense mounted by Ford’s lawyers, 
with the case (perhaps not surprisingly) ending in a not guilty verdict for 
Ford.231 
Federal prosecutors are in a situation that differs from local 
prosecutors in some important ways.  Foremost among them is access to 
greater resources, which in a case of prosecuting a corporation can make a 
significant difference in the decision to prosecute and the outcome of that 
prosecution.  Federal prosecutors are appointed rather than elected and, 
therefore, less politically connected to local corporate executives and, more 
importantly, much less susceptible to electoral consequences arising out of 
their decision to prosecute than are local prosecutors.232  In theory, this 
should make them more willing and effective in prosecuting corporate 
crime, so the glaring gap in federal criminal law handicaps the very 
prosecutors that are in the best position to bring and win these cases.  This 
makes adding a new federal statute to fill this gap critical, but the gap in the 
law is not the only problem and may not be the most serious problem.233   
This is because despite the differences just mentioned, federal prosecutors 
are in a situation that is similar in some respects to local prosecutors.  They 
may be socially connected to local corporate executives in the same ways 
that local prosecutors are socially connected to them.  If that is the case, it 
may undermine their objectivity with respect to the decision on whether to 
prosecute. 
The decision of a federal prosecutor to bring a case against corporate 
 
 228. See generally LEE STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE? FORD’S PINTO TRIAL (1980). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just Desserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 289, 313 (1998). 
 231. STROBEL, supra note 228. 
 232. Steinzor, supra note 155, at 6. 
 233. See Frank J. Vandall, The Criminalization of Products Liability: An Invitation to Political 
Abuse, Preemption, and Non-enforcement,  57 CATH. U. L. REV. 341, 344 (2008). 
The U.S. Attorney considers a number of criteria in deciding whether to bring a specific 
case.  Those criteria include: the social importance of the case, the number of other cases 
on her desk, the time needed to prosecute the case, the expense of the litigation, the 
likelihood of victory, and the President’s agenda. 
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executives also can be significantly influenced by that prosecutor’s career 
aspirations and DOJ personnel policies.  DOJ policies on promotions and 
salaries may result in focusing on a prosecutor’s won-lost record.234  
Prosecuting a corporate defendant, which typically can be expected to 
invest an enormous amount of resources in defending itself, may be passed 
over in favor of prosecuting easier—more “winnable”—cases, such as 
individual street criminals and perhaps individual white-collar defendants 
as well.  These factors provide a plausible explanation for why federal 
prosecutors who, in theory, have access to far greater resources than local 
prosecutors, fail to prosecute large corporations for wrongful activities, 
including selling dangerous products.  Those same factors, along with the 
gap in the criminal code, also provide a plausible explanation for the 
frequent use by federal prosecutors of DPAs.  This problem will be 
addressed next. 
 
7. Excessive Use of DPAs.   
 
While a DPA entered into between a corporation and the prosecutor 
on behalf of the government may encompass some positive changes in the 
corporate structure and compliance regime, they clearly are not the same as 
a guilty plea.235  It is common for a DPA to specify that the company denies 
any wrongdoing, so it lacks the moral condemnation that a guilty plea or 
guilty verdict entails.  Even if the DPA includes a large fine, a DPA does 
not entail a conviction and the stigma that would go with it, which will 
undermine its deterrent effect.  The deterrent effect is further undermined if 
the negotiated fine may be considered “just the cost of doing business.” 
Finally, the matter of fairness of DPAs should be considered.  The 
regular use of DPAs with corporations and their very infrequent use with 
individual defendants raises a question about the fairness of this practice.  
For individual defendants, especially those accused of street crimes, the 
choices given to them by the prosecutor are quite limited and unattractive.  
The choices are pleading guilty or going to trial with the risk of being 
convicted.  With the latter choice, if the defendant is convicted, the 
punishment imposed likely will be much harsher than it would be if the 
defendant agreed to plead guilty.236  It would be very rare for a case against 
an individual defendant to be resolved with a DPA in which the defendant 
 
 234. EISINGER, supra note 23. 
 235. See generally David M. Uhlman, Deferred Prosecution and Non-prosecution Agreements and 
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295 (2013). 
 236. Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearch 
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/49ZS-LDR2]. 
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admits no wrongdoing and agrees to pay a fine.  Even if the fine is a hefty 
one, the DPA entails no moral stigma and, more importantly, entails no 
finding or admission of guilt.  This is significant because if there is a 
finding or admission of guilt, the defendant will be treated much more 
harshly if he enters the criminal justice system in the future.237  There is no 
doubt that an individual defendant would prefer to resolve a case against 
him with a DPA, but that choice would rarely be offered.  Giving a 
corporate defendant the opportunity to enter into a DPA is grossly unfair 
and is evidence of corporate coddling.  While some commentators have 
argued that the use of DPAs leads to over-inclusive enforcement, giving 
prosecutors too much discretion and forcing even innocent corporations to 
accept responsibility to avoid prosecution,238 we believe that, overall, DPAs 
give corporations an unfair advantage over individual defendants and 
undermine the essential policy goals of the criminal law. 
This section has shown that there is an array of problems with the 
current regime of state and federal criminal law as applied to individuals 
and corporations that sell dangerous products.  In addition to gaps in the 
law and inadequate fines, there are sociological and organizational 
problems that undermine its effectiveness in addressing the problem.  The 
next part of the article will discuss ways to remedy these problems and our 
proposal for needed reforms. 
 
III.  A TWO-PRONGED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DANGEROUS 
VEHICLES 
 
The forgoing discussion has shown that there is an array of problems 
that has  contributed to the inability of the current regime of state and 
federal criminal law to adequately address the matter of injuries and death 
caused by dangerous vehicles.  While not every one of these problems has 
a solution, we will argue that a few specifically targeted reforms put in 
place simultaneously would bring about a significant improvement in this 
area of the law.  Using terminology associated with the American Legal 
Realist Movement,239 the necessary reforms can be separated into the law 
“in books” and the law “in action.”  Both will be discussed in this part of 
the article. 
 
 237. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bryant, Section 3 E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining 
with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269 (1995). 
 238. See e.g., Weissmann, supra note 117, at 1322 (arguing that under current policy “no systemic 
checks effectively restrict the government’s power to go after corporations”). 
 239. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
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A.  THE LAW IN BOOKS 
 
1.  New Federal Criminal Statute Needed 
 
To give federal prosecutors the statutory tools they need to effectively 
prosecute cases involving dangerous vehicles, the glaring gap in the federal 
criminal code must be repaired.  Congress has already made the judgment 
that the specific conduct targeted in the TREAD Act should be prohibited 
and, in some cases, imposed criminal liability for violation of TREAD 
provisions.  Arguably, the enactment of the TREAD Act reflected  
Congress’s judgment that tort law was inadequate to assure automobile 
safety and needed to be supplemented with an alternative sanctioning 
mechanism.  However, it is clear that at least in the Toyota and GM cases 
the existing scheme was still inadequate.  The fear of possible civil 
penalties, even compensatory awards supplemented by punitive damages, 
did not provide a sufficient deterrent effect.  Nor did the fear of criminal 
prosecution under the TREAD Act motivate the manufacturers to report the 
defect in a timely manner. 
Following the Toyota recalls, there were calls for legislative reforms.  
In the wake of the GM recalls, Ralph Nader, among others, called for 
statutory reforms.240  Legislative proposals focused on increasing civil 
penalties241 and mandating greater disclosure of defects.242  The latest of 
these proposals, the Grow America Act of 2015243 proposed increased civil 
 
 240. Press Release (April 8, 2014).  Center for Corporate Policy, http://www.corporatepolicy. 
org/2014/04/08/after-gm-disaster-nader-groups-call-for-criminal-liability-for-hiding-product-dangers/ 
[https://perma.cc/5592-GEWY]. 
 241. J. Plungis, GM hearings revive debate on tougher corporate penalties.  ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (2014), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/gm-hearings-revive-debate-on-tougher-
corporate-penalties/article_f3216ad4-33d3-5efd-9091-a0ce499b3245.html [https://perma.cc/L3ZM-
CVW9].  For example, Senate Bill 1743 proposed increased civil penalties and criminal sanctions 
where a business or corporate officer received “actual knowledge” of a serious danger associated with a 
covered product, and failed to verbally inform the appropriate federal agency “as soon as practicable 
and no later than 24 hours after acquiring such knowledge.”  S. 1743, 114th Cong. § 2082 (a)(1) (2015). 
 242. For example, Senate Bill 1743 proposed imposing additional early warning reporting 
requirements on automobile manufacturers.  H.R. 1743, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015).  Any information 
disclosed to the NHTSA would be disclosed to the public through an early warning reporting database.  
H.R. 1743, 114th Cong. § 102 (c)(i)(II) (2015).  Under House Bill 1181 an automobile manufacturer 
would have had a duty to send to the DOT “a true or representative copy of each communication to the 
manufacturer’s dealers or to the owners or purchasers of a motor vehicle” concerning any safety defect 
or failure to comply with motor vehicle safety standard.  H.R. 1181, 114th Cong. § 101 (1)(a),(b) 
(2015).  If a motor vehicle was determined to have a defect, dealers would be forbidden from selling or 
leasing a used vehicle until the defect was remedied.  H.R. 1181, 114th Cong. § 205(k) (2015). 
 243. H.R. 2410, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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penalties for failure to report safety defects.244  To date, only one legislative 
response has been enacted into law—the Motor Vehicle Safety 
Whistleblower Act.245  This Act offers a “bounty” to auto insiders who 
reported serious safety violations. 
While we are not opposed to increasing sanctions for failure to report 
safety defects, we believe that this fails to get to the root of the problem.  
Currently, there is no law that prohibits an automobile manufacturer from 
selling cars that it knows will kill or injure people.  Increasing the penalties 
for failure to notify people of these defects is a laudable first step but is 
inadequate to deal with the problems discussed in Part II. 
To repair the glaring gap in the federal criminal code we propose the 
enactment of a new criminal statute that would make it a federal crime for 
any person or corporation to intentionally or recklessly place into interstate 
commerce a vehicle or components of a vehicle knowing or having reason 
to know it has a defect that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
 
2.  Features of the Statute 
 
Note that our proposal would apply to individuals and to corporations.  
It would also apply to suppliers of automotive components and vehicle 
manufacturers.  Deterring suppliers from selling components to 
manufacturers that they know or have reason to know are defective would 
significantly reduce the likelihood that a vehicle with such a component 
would ever be sold to a consumer.  Liability would be based on an 
intentional act, defining intent in the conventional way in the case of an 
individual246 and using the corporate ethos theory in the case of a 
corporation, or upon recklessness, defining reckless in the conventional 
way.247  Allowing liability based on recklessness is based on the concern 
that in an organizational setting, decision making often is so fragmented 
that it is difficult to find an individual who made a specific decision with 
specific knowledge.  Attaching liability for recklessness would allow 
liability to be based on disregard of the risk associated with a defective 
vehicle or component. 
The proposed statute would base liability on a defective vehicle or 
component that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.  The 
purpose of this is to impose liability without having to wait for someone to 
 
 244. H.R. 2410 § 4110. 
 245. 49 U.S.C § 30172 (2015). 
 246. LaFave, supra note 145, at § 5.2. 
 247. LaFave, supra note 145, at § 5.4. 
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be killed or seriously injured.  Of course, a provision could be added to the 
statute that would enhance the punishment(s) if the defect actually causes a 
death or serious injury. 
 
B.  PUNISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
 
1. Monetary Fine 
 
In the case of an individual convicted under the statute based on 
intent, punishment should include a monetary fine.  If a fine is intended to 
deter (specifically, or generally, or both), then it will fail to accomplish that 
goal unless it is large enough to “hurt.”  Because the wealth of individuals 
who might be prosecuted under this statute would range from modest (i.e. 
middle management, automotive engineers) to high (i.e., corporate 
executives), the amount of the fine should correspondingly range from 
modest to large.  In this context, we urge the adoption of the day fine as an 
equitable method to address the problem of large wealth disparities among 
defendants in this and other criminal cases.  The amount of the fine would 
be based on one day of the defendant’s income multiplied by a specified 
number that is calibrated to reflect the seriousness of the offense.  Because 
the executive’s income for a day is far larger than is the case for someone 
in middle management, the total amount of the fine imposed on the 
executive will be correspondingly larger.248  In addition, there should also 
be a provision in both sections of the statute prohibiting reimbursement to 
the individual defendant by the corporation and another provision 
specifying that the amount of the fine is not a deductible business expense 
for purposes of federal income tax. 
It is reasonable to ask whether a monetary fine, of any size, will 
provide meaningful deterrence.  In theory, there is an amount of money 
that, if imposed as a criminal fine, will deter corporate executives from 
engaging in the kind of wrongful behavior that the statute targets. It is 
reasonable to believe that in the white-collar arena, the corporate actor 
might actually calculate the costs and benefits of his action.249  
Manufacturing and marketing a dangerous vehicle presumably fits into the 
same category.  However, because the likelihood of detection and 
 
 248. For a discussion of the day fine and examples from Sweden and Germany see PHILIP L. 
REICHEL, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A TOPICAL APPROACH, 234–35 (6th ed. 2013). 
 249. Lynch, supra note 125, at 45 (White-collar crime is “by definition carried out in the economic 
arena, where the pursuit of financial profit and the calculation of the costs and risks of choices is 
characteristic.  Mail fraud, unlike murder, is not commonly a crime of blinding passion.”). 
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prosecution is perceived to be small, the threat of criminal penalties might 
offer scant deterrent effect.250  It is for this reason that the punishments 
under the proposed statute must include incarceration and community 
corrections. 
 
2.  Incarceration 
 
More important than a monetary fine is the potential for incarceration.  
Including incarceration in the array of punishments in the statute will go far 
in deterring the targeted conduct, as well as signaling society’s 
condemnation of it.  Relatively brief periods of incarceration can be 
expected to adequately deter, except in situations of multiple convictions of 
an individual defendant—in which case longer periods of incarceration 
would be justified.  An option that should be considered in the  statute is 
making incarceration mandatory in cases in which the defective vehicle or 
component causes a death.  Such a measure would prevent judges from 
imposing monetary fines in lieu of incarceration in cases where effective 
deterrence or society’s moral condemnation call for incarceration. 
 
3.  Community corrections 
 
Sanctions such as community service and probation would be 
appropriate to include in the array of punishments under the  statute.  These 
might be imposed in conjunction with a monetary fine or incarceration.  As 
such they should be expected to contribute to effective deterrence as well 
as to signal society’s condemnation of the conduct targeted in the statute. 
 
C. PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATE DEFENDANTS  
 
As we suggested in Part II, while it is important to hold individuals 
accountable when they are responsible for the sale of a dangerous vehicle, 
this should not be the limit of criminal liability.  Holding the corporation 
accountable is important. In some cases, we may not be able to find an 
individual who is responsible, and typically the corporate culture is a 
significant factor in shaping the attitudes and behavior of its employees. 
 
 
 250. The amount of the monetary fine—at any level—must be discounted by the probability of 
detection, prosecution, and conviction.  If corporate executives see this probability as exceedingly 
small, there may not be a monetary fine of any size that will provide meaningful deterrence.  DAVID J. 
PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 7.1-7.2 (2011). 
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1.  Monetary Fines 
 
Monetary fines should be included among the array of punishments 
specified in the statute.  However, for reasons we set out in Part II, we 
believe that monetary fines should not be at the heart of corporate criminal 
punishment.  Too often, monetary fines—even very large monetary fines—
do not provide adequate deterrence because they are seen as merely the 
cost of doing business.  And, for the same reason, they do not adequately 
signal society’s condemnation of the defendant’s conduct.  This is 
especially the case when the fine is part of a DPA. 
 
2.. New Punishment Strategies 
 
Because monetary fines are inadequate and incarceration is obviously 
not a punishment option in the case of a corporate defendant, we believe 
that new, more creative punishments (i.e. corporate incapacitation) should 
be implemented in such cases.  Starting with the least severe, we propose 
that in an appropriate case, a convicted corporation be debarred from 
government (state, or federal, or both) contracts for a meaningful period.  
Governments are customers of automobile manufacturers with the purchase 
of vehicle fleets on a regular basis.  Debarring a convicted manufacturer 
from supplying vehicles under a government contract for a meaningful 
period will have an impact on corporate profits and, therefore, have some 
deterrent effect.  It would also signal society’s condemnation of the 
defendant.  However, because governments are not a significant portion of 
automobile manufacturers’ customer base, debarment alone would clearly 
not be an adequate punishment. 
Suspension of or restrictions of a business license on a state or local 
basis for a meaningful period would have a greater deterrent effect than 
debarment.  For example, a corporation convicted in a state criminal 
prosecution might be prohibited from selling vehicles in that state for a 
period of time.  On the federal level, suspension of or restrictions on a 
corporate charter for a meaningful period would have an even greater 
deterrent effect because it could be national in scope.  This sanction would 
be effective only at the federal level because only on that level would it 
prevent a convicted corporation from shifting business operations from a 
state in which it is restricted or suspended to different states to minimize 
the financial impact of the sanction.  Clearly, the suspension or restriction 
of a corporate charter would be an unambiguous signal of society’s 
condemnation of the defendant. 
Finally, in egregious cases, including situations in which the corporate 
defendant has multiple convictions over a period of time, revocation of the 
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corporate charter should be available as a sentencing option, especially in 
cases where the defective vehicle was placed intentionally in interstate 
commerce and caused loss of life.  Justifications for this corporate “death” 
penalty are not difficult to find.  One need only look at the justifications for 
the proliferation over the last few years of death penalty provisions in 
federal and state criminal statutes.251  This last point is not intended as an 
endorsement of the death penalty for individuals on either the state or the 
federal level.  Instead, we are suggesting that if the death penalty is 
available to impose on individual defendants, there is no reason that the 
corporate “death penalty” should not also be imposed in cases where a 
corporation knowingly places a dangerous vehicle in interstate commerce 
and causes loss of life.  Even if the evidence on the deterrent effect may 
turn out to be ambiguous, there is no penalty that would send a clearer 
signal to a convicted corporate defendant that society is condemning their 
conduct.  The corporate form is a privilege.  A corporation that has caused 
the loss of life through an intentional act does not deserve to continue to 
enjoy those benefits, especially when there are prior convictions for the 
same offense.  As is the case with suspension or restrictions on a corporate 
charter, revocation of a corporate charter would be most effective at the 
federal level because only on that level would it prevent a convicted 
corporation from evading the penalty by simply incorporating in another 
state and continuing with business as usual.252  The statute also should 
authorize the sentencing judge to use his or her equitable powers to bar 
individual corporate officers from re-incorporating under a new name and 





In a departure from traditional criminal punishments, but in keeping 
with the recent trends in punishment, we urge that restitution be part of the 
array of sanctions that can be imposed on a corporate defendant convicted 
 
 251. See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole, Science and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence, 
and the Debate Over Capital Punishment in the United States, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603 (2009). 
 252. In nineteen states the professional licenses of people who fall behind on their student loan 
payments can be revoked.  These states are obviously unconcerned by the fact that without the license 
the debtor will be unable to earn money with which to pay their student load debt. These states also are 
obviously unconcerned by any “spillover effect” that might result with respect to the debtor’s children, 
spouse, partners, employees, etc.  If individuals are having their professional licenses revoked for 
falling behind on their student loan payments, surely it is fair to revoke the business license or charter of 
a corporation that kills people by knowingly selling dangerous vehicles.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 
Stacy Cowley & Natalie Kitroeff, When Unpaid Student Loan Bills Mean You Can No Longer Work, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 18, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business/student-loans-licenses. 
html [https://perma.cc/9AA3-A29V]l. 
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under the  statute.  As we suggested in Part II, a significant shortcoming of 
both administrative fines and traditional monetary fines in criminal cases is 
that the victims’ need for compensation is completely overlooked.  Both 
administrative fines and criminal fines are paid to the government.  While 
this may be effective in some cases in deterring future criminal behavior 
and signaling society’s condemnation of the defendant’s conduct, it does 
nothing to remedy the significant hardships associated with the death or 
serious injury caused by the defendant’s conduct.  The statute should 
require the sentencing judge to order that restitution be provided by 





It goes without saying that all federal statutes must be solidly based on 
more or more enumerated powers granted to Congress in the 
Constitution.254  The federal statute proposed here is clearly within the 
scope of the interstate commerce power.  While it is true that starting with 
United States v. Lopez in 1995,255 the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed to 
some extent the scope of the interstate commerce power. That trend, if it is 
a trend, has been limited to those activities affecting interstate commerce 
and has not impacted Congress’s power to regulate the channels or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.256  The criminal statute we 
propose here is  on constitutional ground as solid as the federal felon in 
possession statute257 and the federal carjacking statute,258 to name just two. 
 
 253. There is an empirical question on whether and to what extent various punishments deter 
corporations and corporate executives.  The literature does not provide a clear answer, but the 
consensus is that the threat of punishment does deter.  Schlegel, supra note 124, at 15-24; Schell-Busey, 
Simpson, & Rorie, supra note 151, at 387.  Even if the matter remains the subject of some debate, 
however, we do not believe that this undermines the soundness of our proposals.  Even if there were not 
convincing evidence that the punishments we propose deter, it is critical to keep in mind that there are 
justifications for punishment other than deterrence.  Punishment can be (and in the case of dangerous 
vehicles, ought to be) justified as a matter of just desert.  Even if some specific punishment may not 
deter, it is nevertheless appropriate because it expresses society’s condemnation of the corporation and 
its managers.  In the case of a corporate defendant it is punishment for maintaining a corporate ethos 
that led to the deaths and injuries. 
 254. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 575 (2013). 
 255. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 256. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 4.8(b), 4.9(d) (8th ed. 
2010).  See also, e.g., Victoria Davis, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact of United States v. Lopez, 
115 S. Ct. 1624, On the Federalization of Criminal Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 115 (1996). 
 257. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).  See, e.g., Barbara H. Taylor, Close Enough for Government Work: 
Proving Minimal Nexus in a Federal Firearms Conviction: United States v. Corey, 56 ME. L. REV. 187 
(2004). 
 258. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012).  See generally Klein & Grobey, supra note 132. 
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The federal statute we propose here is an essential element in 
remedying the inadequacies of the current legal regime dealing with 
injuries and death caused by dangerous vehicles.  However, we have 
already suggested that while new laws will give federal prosecutors the 
needed statutory tools to prosecute automobile manufacturers and their 
employees, these laws clearly would not be sufficient to bring about the 
necessary changes in how the law works in such cases.  We have already 
suggested in Part II that a study of the law “in action,” that is, how the law 
works in the real world, points to the significant need for organizational 
reform in the DOJ.  The next section will address this important matter. 
 
C.  THE LAW IN ACTION 
 
In Part IIC we highlighted the reasons why there is a lack of criminal 
prosecutions for injuries and deaths caused by dangerous vehicles.  These 
problems exist on the state and local level with respect to both prosecutions 
of individuals and of corporations.  They also exist, but to a far lesser 
extent, on the federal level. 
We outlined the array of economic, political, and sociological 
problems on the state and local level that render prosecutors unable and 
unwilling to bring criminal cases against corporate executives and other 
corporate employees.  These problems become even more daunting when 
the subject of a potential prosecution is a corporation, which can be 
expected to mount a far more rigorous and costly defense than would be the 
case with an individual defendant, even a wealthy defendant.  In light of 
this reality, we believe that the multitude of problems with prosecuting 
both corporations and corporate executives on the state and local level are 
insurmountable.  The lack of adequate resources is chronic.  The inherent 
responsibility of local prosecutors for prosecuting other crime demands an 
overwhelming majority of their resources and attention.259  The potential 
political fallout from prosecuting either a corporation or a corporate 
executive is paralyzing, so long as the office of local prosecutor is an 
elected office.  We believe that these insurmountable problems require that 
we pin our hopes on federal prosecutors to effectively deal with deaths and 
injuries caused by dangerous vehicles.  Even though federal prosecutors are 
free from some of the handicaps under which local prosecutors operate, 
their situation is in some ways similar to that of a local prosecutor.  For this 
reason, we propose that the following reforms be implemented in addition 
to the statutory proposal outlined in Part III A. 
 
 
 259. Steinzor, supra note 155, at 63. 
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1.  Outside Review of Decisions to Not Prosecute and of DPAs 
 
Federal prosecutors enjoy far more political independence than local 
prosecutors could ever enjoy; however, they may still be socially connected 
with corporate executives, especially if they are in a district in which the 
corporation has a substantial presence.  These personal connections may 
result in more lenient treatment of a corporation or its executives than 
justified.  For this reason, we propose that the DOJ adopt a policy requiring 
an evaluation by outside prosecutors of a decision to not prosecute a 
corporation or corporate executives when there has been a death or serious 
injury caused by a defective vehicle.  Prosecutors brought in from another 
district can insure a reasonable measure of independent decision making on 
this critical matter.  We propose that the same sort of outside review take 
place anytime there are negotiations underway to enter into a DPA.260  
While a DPA may be appropriate in some cases, there is a substantial risk 
that they will resolve a case in a manner that is far too lenient with respect 
to the policy goals of the criminal law. 
 
2. Adequate Resources 
 
Federal prosecutors enjoy an abundance of resources compared with 
the amount of resources usually available to local prosecutors; however, the 
prosecution of a corporate executive may require resources beyond the 
amount federal prosecutors need for a typical case.  The prosecution of a 
corporation would most likely require an even greater amount of resources.  
We propose instituting a policy requiring all United States Attorneys to 
monitor criminal prosecutions of corporations and their executives and to 
ensure that the prosecutors who are handling such cases have sufficient 
resources to respond to whatever level of defense is put up by the 
defendant. 
 
3.  DOJ Personnel Policies 
 
We suggested in Part II that a significant reason for federal 
prosecutors’ reluctance to bringing criminal cases against corporations and 
corporate executives can be found in DOJ policies relating to salaries and 
promotions, especially the emphasis on an individual prosecutor’s “won-
lost ” record.  The career aspirations of a typical federal prosecutor may 
 
 260. Steinzor states that “prosecutors are rarely asked why they fail to pursue white-collar criminal 
enforcement . . . . and their motivations have never been studied empirically at the federal level.”  Id. at 
42.  An outside review of decisions to not prosecute would inject a measure of fairness into the process. 
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incline him or her to avoid bringing cases against corporations and other 
defendants who could be expected to put up a significant defense and, 
instead, bring cases against street criminals and other individual defendants 
who, without the help of a public defender, are barely able to put up any 
defense.  This may be a significant part of the problem addressed in this 
article.  We urge the DOJ to review its own personnel policies and those of 
each U.S. Attorney’s office.  Policies that focus heavily on won-lost  
records for purposes of salary and promotion should be abandoned in favor 
of policies that reward tackling difficult cases, especially cases against 
corporations that have engaged in intentional or reckless behavior that 
results in loss of life or serious personal injury.  Other things being equal, a 
“loss” in such as case should be given more credit than a “win” in a case 
against an individual defendant. 
 
4.  Curtail the Use of DPAs 
 
The final reform we propose is for the DOJ to adopt a policy that 
curtails the use of DPAs generally, especially in cases involving large 
corporations.  Although there are some legitimate uses of PDAs, we 
suggested in Part II that a PDA in which the defendant denies any 
wrongdoing, completely lacks the moral condemnation which is an 
essential part of a criminal conviction, and even when it includes a large 
monetary fine, fails to provide an adequate deterrent.  We propose a policy 
that normally gives corporate defendants the same limited and unattractive 
options that are given to individual defendants: plead guilty (perhaps to 
reduced charges) and accept the punishment offered or plead not guilty and 
bear the risk of conviction and a much harsher punishment.  If a case has 
unusual circumstances suggesting that a DPA is the best way to resolve a 
criminal charge, an outside review of the case should be required before the 




We are aware that those who are concerned with the over-
criminalization of American business specifically or American society 
generally will hesitate to support our proposal, which openly pushes for an 
additional criminal statute and increased enforcement of all criminal 
statutes relating to the manufacture and sale of dangerous vehicles.  Those 
who advocate blanket corporate criminal immunity most likely will 
experience apoplexy well before reaching this portion of the article.  In 
light of the varying degrees of resistance that our proposals will meet, it 
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should be emphasized that when a manufacturer negligently designs and 
sells a defective car (or any other consumer product), civil liability under 
tort law or regulatory action is appropriate.  We do not see a moral 
compulsion in this situation to punish the manufacturer and do not see 
these actions as particularly blameworthy.  The civil tort law and regulatory 
regimes, while not perfect, are the appropriate way to deal with such cases. 
On the other hand, in a situation like the Toyota or GM cases, where a 
manufacturer discovers a defect in its vehicle that is likely to lead to death 
or serious bodily injury, and it does lead to death and serious bodily injury, 
and  the manufacturer learns of this and still does nothing—fails to notify 
the public, fails to recall the car, and lies to the regulatory agency 
responsible for promoting safety in the industry—its action is worthy of 
moral condemnation, and criminal liability is appropriate.  The problems in 
the existing criminal law regime render it inadequate for this task.  While 
not every one of these problems has a realistic solution, the reforms we 
propose, which are aimed at both fixing the glaring gap in federal law and 
significantly improving its enforcement, will greatly strengthen the law and 
enable it to respond adequately to the problem of deaths and injuries caused 
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